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INTRODUCTION 
In the past few years, the United States has been busy 
negotiating the Trans-Pacific Partnership (“TPP”) Agreement 
with countries in the Asia-Pacific region. These countries 
include Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan, 
Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam. 
As Ronald Kirk, then-United States Trade Representative 
(“USTR”), declared when the negotiations began in Melbourne, 
Australia: 
Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations offer a unique 
opportunity to shape a high-standard, broad-based regional 
pact. In line with the President’s goal of supporting two 
million additional American jobs through exports, a robust 
                                                                                                             
* Copyright © 2014 Peter K. Yu. Kern Family Chair in Intellectual Property Law 
and Director, Intellectual Property Law Center, Drake University Law School. Earlier 
versions of this Article were presented at the “Trade and Transparency in the Internet 
Age” Conference at Yale Law School and “The Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement: 
Impact and Implications” Workshop at the Faculty of Law, Chinese University of Hong 
Kong, and as a public lecture at the School of Law at Xiamen University in China. The 
Article also benefits from the insights provided by a briefing meeting with the 
negotiators of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement during the 14th negotiating 
round in Leesburg, Virginia. The Author is grateful to Sean Flynn, Margot Kaminski, 
Lin Xiuqin, and Bryan Mercurio for their kind invitations and the other participants of 
these events for valuable comments, suggestions, and helpful exchanges. 
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TPP agreement would expand our exports to one of the 
world’s fastest-growing regions. Our team’s aim is to achieve 
the biggest economic benefits for the American people, and 
these negotiators will be working to set a new standard for 
21st century trade pacts.1 
The TPP began as a quadrilateral agreement between 
Brunei Darussalam, Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore known 
as the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement, 
or more commonly as the “P4” or “Pacific 4.”2 As Meredith 
Lewis recounted: 
[The negotiations were initially] launched by Chile, New 
Zealand and Singapore at the APEC [Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation Forum] leaders’ summit in 2002. These 
original negotiations contemplated an agreement amongst 
the three participating countries, to be known as the Pacific 
Three Closer Economic Partnership (P3 CEP). However, 
Brunei attended a number of rounds as an observer, and 
ultimately joined the Agreement as a ‘founding member’. 
The Agreement was signed by New Zealand, Chile and 
Singapore on July 18, 2005 and by Brunei on August 2, 
2005, following the conclusion of negotiations in June 
2005.3 
In March 2010, the TPP negotiations began among Australia, 
Peru, Vietnam, the United States, and the P4 members for an 
expanded agreement.4 Since then, Malaysia, Canada, Mexico, 
and Japan have joined the negotiations.5 
                                                                                                             
1. Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative [USTR], USTR Begins 
TPP Talks in Australia (Mar. 15, 2010), available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/
press-office/press-releases/2010/march/ustr-begins-tpp-talks-australia [hereinafter 
TPP Launch Press Release]. 
2. Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement, Brunei-Chile-N.Z.-
Sing., July 18, 2005, 2592 U.N.T.S. 225. 
3. Meredith Kolsky Lewis, Expanding the P-4 Trade Agreement into a Broader Trans-
Pacific Partnership: Implications, Risks and Opportunities, 4 ASIAN J. WTO & INT’L HEALTH 
L. & POL’Y 401, 403–04 (2009). 
4. TPP Launch Press Release, supra note 1. 
5. Press Release, Office of the USTR, Statement of the Ministers and Heads of 
Delegation for the Trans-Pacific Partnership Countries (Feb. 25, 2014), available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2014/February/Statement-
of-Ministers-and-Heads-of-Delegation-for-TPP-countries. 
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Although it remains unclear which of the nearly thirty 
chapters6—or, more importantly, which specific provisions in 
those chapters—will be included in the final text of the TPP 
Agreement, the negotiations have been quite controversial. In 
addition to the usual concerns about having high standards that 
are heavily lobbied by industries and arguably inappropriate for 
many participating countries, the TPP negotiations have been 
heavily criticized for their secrecy and lack of transparency, 
accountability, and democratic participation.7 The draft text of 
the TPP intellectual property chapter, for example, was hitherto 
available only through WikiLeaks.8 Since then, the TPP chapter 
on environmental standards has also been publicly leaked.9 
This Article does not seek to continue this line of criticism, 
although transparency, accountability, and democratic 
participation remain highly important. Nor does the Article aim 
to explore the agreement’s implications for each specific trade 
sector, which have already received book-length treatments.10 
Instead, this Article focuses on the ramifications of the exclusion 
of four different parties or groups of parties from the TPP 
negotiations: (1) China; (2) BRICS and other emerging 
economies; (3) Europe (including members of the European 
Union and other countries in the region such as Switzerland); 
                                                                                                             
6 . Deborah Kay Elms, The Trans-Pacific Partnership Trade Negotiations: Some 
Outstanding Issues for the Final Stretch, 8 ASIAN J. WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y 379, 
384 (2013) [hereinafter Elms, TPP Trade Negotiations]. 
7. See, e.g., Letter from Prof. David S. Levine et al. to Ron Kirk, USTR (May 9, 
2012), available at http://infojustice.org/archives/21137. In the interest of full 
disclosure, the Author has signed on to this letter. 
8. James Love, KEI Analysis of Wikileaks Leak of TPP IPR Text, from August 30, 2013, 
KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L (Nov. 13, 2013), http://keionline.org/node/1825.  
9. Wikileaks Releases TPP Environmental Chapter; Once Again Shows Why Negotiators 
Wanted Details Hidden, TECHDIRT (Jan. 15, 2014, 11:02 AM), http://www.techdirt.com/
articles/20140115/07432625883/wikileaks-releases-tpp-environmental-chapter-once-
again-shows-why-negotiators-wanted-details-hidden.shtml. 
10. See, e.g., NO ORDINARY DEAL: UNMASKING THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP 
FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (Jane Kelsey ed., 2010) [hereinafter NO ORDINARY DEAL]; 
JEFFREY J. SCHOTT ET AL., UNDERSTANDING THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP (2012); 
TRADE LIBERALISATION AND INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE 
TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT (Tania Voon ed., 2014) [hereinafter TRADE 
LIBERALISATION AND INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION]; THE TRANS-PACIFIC 
PARTNERSHIP: A QUEST FOR A TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY TRADE AGREEMENT (C.L. Lim et 
al. eds., 2012) [hereinafter TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP]. 
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and (4) civil society organizations. Targeting these “TPP 
outsiders” and using illustrations from the intellectual property 
sector and the larger trade context, 11  this Article seeks to 
highlight the perplexities created by the TPP negotiations. It 
cautions policymakers, commentators, and the public at large 
against the negotiations’ considerable and largely overlooked 
costs. 
I. CHINA 
As far as “TPP outsiders” are concerned, the first country 
that comes to mind is China. The exclusion of this country has 
raised a wide array of questions: Should the TPP be used to serve 
not only economic goals but also noneconomic goals? What role 
would the exclusion of China play in the TPP negotiations? 
Would all negotiating parties be better off with such exclusion? 
Or would such exclusion make the regional pact less valuable 
and less sustainable in the long run? If so, should the TPP 
negotiating parties bring China into the fold to provide 
additional trade benefits? Would the inclusion of the country 
create an additional threat to the weaker negotiating parties? Or 
would such inclusion help them resist the demands of the 
United States, Japan, and other major trading powers?12 
When the TPP is criticized for being used to isolate or 
contain China, two rebuttals are usually offered. The first one, 
which is rather defensive, points out that, even though the TPP 
negotiations have excluded China, the negotiating parties have 
actively engaged the country in other fora at both the 
multilateral and nonmultilateral levels. Consider, for example, 
                                                                                                             
11. Intellectual property remains one of the more sensitive areas in the TPP 
negotiations, along with sugar, dairy, and textiles. See Elms, TPP Trade Negotiations, 
supra note 6, at 384. 
12. Simon Tay noted China’s importance to its Asian neighbors: 
[W]hile many talk about Asians rebalancing their economy to focus more on 
regional and domestic consumption rather than depending on the American 
consumer, the first alternative market they usually look to is that of China. If 
China keeps growing over the medium to longer run, this will help not only 
its own people but many more across Asia, and attract more and more of 
them to China. 
SIMON TAY, ASIA ALONE: THE DANGEROUS POST-CRISIS DIVIDE FROM AMERICA 49 
(2010). 
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the United States’ engagement with China. Since 2006, the two 
countries have engaged in the high-profile US-China Strategic 
and Economic Dialogue.13 For more than three decades, China 
and the United States have also had regular meetings through 
the US-China Joint Committee on Commerce and Trade 
(JCCT), which “was established in 1983 as a forum for high-level 
dialogue on bilateral trade issues and a vehicle for promoting 
commercial relations.”14 
Although this rebuttal effectively denies the existence of an 
overarching US foreign policy toward isolating or containing 
China, it speaks very little to the motives behind the TPP 
negotiations. Given China’s current position as the world’s 
second largest economy, it is virtually impossible to imagine the 
United States and other TPP negotiating parties not having any 
active and continuous engagement with the country. Such 
engagement is also badly needed in sensitive noneconomic 
matters such as nuclear nonproliferation and peace-keeping 
operations, not to mention China’s veto power in the UN 
Security Council. 
Thus, the important question here is not whether other 
international discussions are still being held between China and 
the TPP negotiating parties. Those discussions will be held 
regardless. Rather, the question should be why the TPP 
negotiations have excluded China when countries are already 
very eager to engage the country in international discussions. 
More specifically, what are the motives behind such exclusion? 
The second rebuttal suggests that the TPP’s goals have been 
misunderstood by many, including those in China. As this 
counterargument goes, the plan of the TPP is not to isolate or 
                                                                                                             
13. The US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue was originally established by 
the Bush administration in 2006 as the US-China Strategic Economic Dialogue. See 
JOHN NAISBITT & DORIS NAISBITT, CHINA’S MEGATRENDS: THE 8 PILLARS OF A NEW 
SOCIETY 157 (2010); see also Bonnie S. Glaser, The Diplomatic Relationship: Substance and 
Process, in TANGLED TITANS: THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA 151, 158–61 (David 
Shambaugh ed., 2012) [hereinafter TANGLED TITANS] (discussing the US-China 
Strategic and Economic Dialogue). 
14. US-China Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT), INT’L TRADE ADMIN., 
http://www.mac.doc.gov/china/JCCTforweb.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2014). 
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contain the country, but rather to integrate it to the larger 
international economy.15 
At the moment, China does not possess the necessary 
conditions to be further integrated 16  into what the USTR 
referred to as “a high-standard, 21st-century [trade] 
agreement.”17 As a result, the existing negotiating parties, many 
of which have similar economic, social, and technological 
conditions, have to negotiate first. The plan, however, is to add 
China and other countries at a later point in time when they 
become ready. Even if China eventually decides not to join the 
regional pact, a “TPP first, China later” process would still 
                                                                                                             
15 . See Hillary Rodham Clinton, Sec’y of State, Remarks at Singapore 
Management University (Nov. 17, 2012), available at http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/
st/english/texttrans/2012/11/20121117138825.html (“We welcome the interest of any 
nation willing to meet 21st century standards as embodied in the TPP, including 
China.”); see also SCHOTT ET AL., supra note 10, at 58 (“We see little evidence to support 
the notion that China is being excluded as part of a broader containment strategy.”); 
Ann Capling & John Ravenhill, The TPP: Multilateralizing Regionalism or the Securitization 
of Trade Policy, in TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP, supra note 10, at 279, 293 (noting the 
risk of the “TPP becom[ing] hostage to perceptions that it is part of a US foreign policy 
strategy to contain China”). As Jeffrey Schott, Barbara Kotschwar, and Julia Muir 
observed: 
The containment thesis falls flat for several reasons. First, and most obviously, 
a trade agreement simply cannot “contain” a large country, either 
economically or politically. Second, US officials need a cooperative China to 
confront the myriad problems facing the world economy and the security 
challenges posed by Iran and North Korea as new and aspiring nuclear 
nations in Asia. The United States and China need to work together and 
therefore must manage the inevitable frictions that arise as the breadth and 
scope of their commercial relations expand. Third, no one else in Asia wants 
to contain China either. The trade and investment integration in the Asia-
Pacific region achieved over the past few decades benefits all the TPP 
participants, even as it poses competitiveness challenges for their 
manufacturing industries. The proper response is to use trade arrangements, 
in conjunction with domestic economic reforms, to boost productivity of local 
industry and thereby be better positioned to compete against Chinese firms at 
home and abroad. 
SCHOTT ET AL., supra note 10, at 58. 
16. See SCHOTT ET AL., supra note 10, at 58 (noting that “China is not ready to 
implement and enforce the types of obligations under construction in the TPP 
negotiations”). 
17. Press Release, Office of the USTR, USTR Statement Regarding the Trans-
Pacific Partnership Negotiations (Sept. 5, 2011), available at http://www.ustr.gov/
about-us/press-office/press-releases/2011/september/ustr-statement-regarding-trans-
pacific-partnersh. 
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benefit the United States and other negotiating parties. As 
President Barack Obama recently acknowledged, “if we can get a 
trade deal with all the other countries in Asia that says you’ve got 
to protect people’s intellectual property[,] that will help us in 
our negotiations with China.”18 
Moreover, it is not unusual for like-minded countries to 
band together to develop higher trade standards. To be certain, 
commentators have widely criticized the increased 
fragmentation of the international trading system brought about 
by bilateral, plurilateral, and regional trade agreements.19 For 
example, Pascal Lamy, the Director-General of the World Trade 
Organization (“WTO”), noted that “proliferation is breeding 
concern—concern about incoherence, confusion, exponential 
increase of costs for business, unpredictability and even 
unfairness in trade relations.”20 Likewise, Francis Gurry, the 
then-Director General of the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (“WIPO”), lamented how the negotiating parties 
of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (“ACTA”)21 had 
“tak[en] matters into their own hands to seek solutions outside 
of the multilateral system to the detriment of inclusiveness of 
the present system.”22 
                                                                                                             
18. President Barack Obama, Press Conference by the President, WHITE HOUSE, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/10/08/press-conference-president 
(Oct. 8, 2013); see also Capling & Ravenhill, supra note 15, at 292 (“Obama identified 
the TPP as a ‘potential model’ for the entire region, thus melding together US business 
interests and foreign policy interests to put pressure on China and others.”). 
19. See generally Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, The Empire’s New Clothes: 
Political Economy and the Fragmentation of International Law, 60 STAN. L. REV. 595, 596–
600 (2007) (discussing the growing “proliferation of international regulatory 
institutions with overlapping jurisdictions and ambiguous boundaries”); Peter K. Yu, 
International Enclosure, the Regime Complex, and Intellectual Property Schizophrenia, 2007 
MICH. ST. L. REV. 1, 13–21 [hereinafter Yu, International Enclosure] (discussing the 
development of the “international intellectual property regime complex”). 
20 . Pascal Lamy, Dir.-Gen., World Trade Org., Opening Remarks at the 
Conference on “Multilateralizing Regionalism” in Geneva (Sept. 10, 2007), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl67_e.htm. 
21. Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, opened for signature May 1, 2011, 50 
I.L.M. 243 (2011) [hereinafter ACTA]. 
22. Catherine Saez, ACTA a Sign of Weakness in Multilateral System, WIPO Head Says, 
INTELL. PROP. WATCH (June 30, 2010, 6:18 PM), http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/
2010/06/30/acta-a-sign-of-weakness-in-multilateral-system-wipo-head-says/. 
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Nevertheless, the establishment of bilateral, plurilateral, 
and regional trade agreements can result in more harmonized 
standards if these agreements are eventually consolidated into 
what commentators once described as “TRIPS II”23—referring 
to a potential major revision of the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights24 (“TRIPS Agreement”). 
In the TPP context, greater harmonization can also occur if 
Asia-Pacific regionalism is eventually multilateralized.25 
In general, nonmultilateral agreements are likely to be 
consolidated if they provide enough incentives for outsiders to 
join at later stages. As Ruth Okediji pointed out, countries may 
seek to “consolidate and (perhaps improve) the gains from 
bilateralism” once they have developed a “network of bilateral 
agreements [that] is sufficiently dense” for that purpose.26 Cho 
Sungjoon concurred: “[R]egionalism may contribute to 
multilateralism under certain circumstances through a 
‘laboratory effect’. After experiencing trial and error as well as 
learning-by-doing in the regional level, countries may feel 
confident in ratcheting these regional initiatives up to the 
multilateral forum.”27 
The negotiation of many key international agreements, in 
fact, began with mini-negotiations among a small group of key, 
and often likeminded, players before the negotiations were 
finally extended to other members of the international 
community. A case in point is the negotiation of the TRIPS 
Agreement, which began with trilateral discussions among the 
                                                                                                             
23. See, e.g., DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND 
ANALYSIS 48 (2d ed. 2003); Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The International Intellectual Property 
Law System: New Actors, New Institutions, New Sources, 98 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 213, 
217 (2004); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, TRIPS-Round II: Should Users Strike Back?, 71 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 21, 21 (2004). 
24.  Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 
108 Stat. 4809, 869 U.N.T.S. 299 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. 
25. See Capling & Ravenhill, supra note 15, at 280 (noting “the multilateralization 
of regionalism in the Asia-Pacific”). 
26 . Ruth L. Okediji, Back to Bilateralism? Pendulum Swings in International 
Intellectual Property Protection, 1 U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 125, 143 (2004). 
27. Cho Sungjoon, A Bridge Too Far: The Fall of the Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference 
in Cancún and the Future of Trade Constitution, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 219, 238 (2004). 
2014] TPP AND TRANS-PACIFIC PERPLEXITIES 1137 
European Communities, Japan, and the United States. 28 
Another good, but much earlier, example is the establishment 
of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial 
Property29 and the Berne Convention for the Protection of 
Literary and Artistic Works.30 As Bryan Mercurio recounted in 
regard to these two cornerstone agreements: 
By the mid-1800s, . . . trading nations had created a 
complex web of agreements in which [most-favoured-nation 
and national treatments] applied bilaterally. When the 
“spaghetti bowl” agreements became unmanageable, 
practitioners and government[s] realized the rights needed 
to be formally adopted in an international framework. Such 
efforts built upon the bilateralism by filling gaps and 
providing coherence to [intellectual property rights]. This 
process culminated in the Paris Convention . . . and the 
Berne Convention . . . .31 
To a great extent, bilateral, plurilateral, and regional trade 
agreements have been used as “building blocks.” For example, 
                                                                                                             
28. See generally SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION 
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 96–120 (2003) (recounting the trilateral 
discussions among the United States, the European Union, and Japan). 
29. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 21 
U.S.T. 1538, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 (revised at Stockholm July 14, 1967). 
30. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works app., Sept. 
9, 1886, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (revised at Paris July 24, 1971). 
31. Bryan Mercurio, TRIPS-Plus Provisions in FTAs: Recent Trends, in REGIONAL 
TRADE AGREEMENTS AND THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM 215, 217 (Lorand Bartels & Federico 
Ortino eds., 2007). Jagdish Bhagwati coined the term “spaghetti bowl.” Jagdish 
Bhagwati, U.S. Trade Policy: The Infatuation with Free Trade Areas, in THE DANGEROUS 
DRIFT TO PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 1, 2–3 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Anne O. 
Krueger eds., 1995). This term refers to “a mish-mash of overlapping, supporting, and 
possibly conflicting, obligations.” Simon Lester & Bryan Mercurio, Introduction to 
BILATERAL AND REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: CASE STUDIES 1, 2 (Simon Lester & 
Bryan Mercurio eds., 2009) [hereinafter BRTA CASE STUDIES]. In the Asian context, 
the Asian Development Bank and other commentators have used the term “noodle 
bowl” instead. Wang Jiangyu, Association of Southeast Asian Nations–China Free Trade 
Agreement, in BRTA CASE STUDIES, supra, at 192, 224 [hereinafter Wang, ACFTA]; Peter 
K. Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 953, 978 (2011); Richard E. 
Baldwin, Managing the Noodle Bowl: The Fragility of East Asian Regionalism (Asian Dev. 
Bank, Working Paper on Regional Economic Integration No. 7, 2007), available at 
http://www.adb.org/documents/papers/regional-economic-integration/WP07-
Baldwin.pdf; Masahiro Kawai & Ganeshan Wignaraja, Asian FTAs: Trends and Challenges 
3 (Asian Dev. Bank, Working Paper No. 144, 2009), available at http://www.adb.org/
documents/Working-Papers/2010/Economics-WP226.pdf. 
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Jason Kearns found the United States–Morocco Free Trade 
Agreement reflecting “a ‘building block’ approach: first 
ensuring that countries accede to the WTO, then negotiating 
trade and investment agreements with individual countries in 
the region (such as the Agreement with Morocco), and finally 
reaching a comprehensive United States–Middle East Free 
Trade Area.”32 The TPP can also be seen “as a building block 
towards a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific [FTAAP]”33—a 
concept APEC studied in 2006 and an agreement it pledged to 
create in 2009.34 If created, the FTAAP is likely to provide 
considerable trade and nontrade benefits to both the Asia-
Pacific region and the global economy.35 
                                                                                                             
32 . Jason Kearns, United States–Morocco Free Trade Agreement, in BRTA CASE 
STUDIES, supra note 31, at 144, 146; see also Chia Siow Yue & Hadi Soesastro, ASEAN 
Perspective on Promoting Regional and Global Freer Trade, in AN APEC TRADE AGENDA? THE 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF A FREE TRADE AREA OF THE ASIA-PACIFIC 190, 198 (Charles E 
Morrison & Eduardo Pedrosa eds., 2007) [hereinafter AN APEC TRADE AGENDA?] 
(“The Singapore government views FTAs as building blocks towards global and APEC 
freer trade. Formation of bilateral FTAs among like-minded partners is seen as a way to 
avoid the problem in which the pace of trade liberalization is held back 
unnecessarily.”). 
33. Jeffrey J. Schott & Julia Muir, US PTAs: What’s Been Done and What It Means for 
the TPP Negotiations, in TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP, supra note 10, at 45, 61. Meredith 
Lewis recounted the origin of the FTAAP: 
In 1994, the APEC membership held its annual meeting in Bogor, Indonesia 
and adopted the Bogor Goals, which included the objective of achieving free 
and open trade and investment amongst developed APEC members by 2010, 
and developing country members by 2020. Although this Bogor Goal has yet 
to be fully realized, APEC has continued to strive towards this objective. And 
consistent with the desire for free trade within APEC, in 2006 APEC 
announced a study into the prospect of a [FTAAP], with later 
pronouncements endorsing an FTAAP as a goal. 
Meredith Kolsky Lewis, The TPP and the RCEP (ASEAN+6) as Potential Paths Toward 
Deeper Asian Economic Integration, 8 ASIAN J. WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y 359, 362 
(2013) [hereinafter Lewis, TPP and RCEP]. For an excellent collection of articles 
discussing the APEC trade agenda and the development of the FTAAP, see generally 
AN APEC TRADE AGENDA?, supra note 32. 
34. See Merdith Kolsky Lewis, Achieving a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific: Does the 
TPP Present the Most Attractive Path?, in TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP, supra note 10, at 
223, 223 [hereinafter Lewis, Achieving a FTAAP]. 
35. According to Fred Bergsten, the FTAAP could provide “the best, or perhaps 
only, way” to: 
x catalyse a substantively successful Doha Round; 
x offer an alternative “Plan B” to restore the momentum of liberalization if 
Doha does falter badly; 
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Thus, if the TPP’s ultimate goal is to develop a treaty that 
requires higher standards than what the WTO currently 
requires, it makes sense to exclude China from the negotiations. 
To begin with, China continues to struggle with a wide variety of 
internal problems despite having joined the international 
trading body in December 2001.36 To date, these problems have 
included “decreasing control by the state, decentralization of 
the central government, significant losses suffered by inefficient 
state-owned enterprises, the widening gap between the rich and 
the poor and between the urban and rural areas, massive urban 
migration, widespread unemployment, corruption, and growing 
unrest in both the cities and the countryside.”37 Given the scale 
and persistence of these problems, it is no surprise that China 
thus far has kept a rather low profile in the WTO—or for that 
matter other intergovernmental organizations.38 As Henry Gao 
explained: 
                                                                                                             
x prevent a further, possibly explosive, proliferation of bilateral and sub-
regional PTAs that create substantial new discrimination and discord 
within the Asia-Pacific region; 
x avoid renewed risk of “drawing a line down the middle of the Pacific” as 
East Asian, and perhaps Western Hemisphere, regional initiatives that 
APEC was created to foster; 
x channel the China-U.S. economic conflict into a more constructive and less 
confrontational context that could defuse at least some of its attendant 
tension and risk; and 
x revitalize APEC itself, which is now of enhanced importance because of the 
risks of Asia-Pacific and especially China-U.S. fissures. 
C. Fred Bergsten, A Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific in the Wake of the Faltering Doha 
Round: Trade Policy Alternatives for APEC, in AN APEC TRADE AGENDA?, supra note 32, at 
15, 32–33. 
36. For a timely collection of articles discussing China’s performance in its first 
decade in the WTO, see generally CHINA AND GLOBAL TRADE GOVERNANCE: CHINA’S 
FIRST DECADE IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (Zeng Ka & Liang Wei eds., 2013). 
37. Symposium, China and the WTO: Progress, Perils, and Prospects, 17 COLUM. J. 
ASIAN L. 1, 3 (2003) (remarks of the Author). 
38. See Henry S. Gao, China’s Participation in the WTO: A Lawyer’s Perspective, 11 
SING. Y.B. INT’L L. 41, 69 (2007) [hereinafter Gao, China’s Participation in the WTO] 
(“Be it in the informal green room meetings, the formal meetings of the various 
committees and councils or the grand sessions of the Ministerial Conferences, China 
has generally been reticent.”); Peter K. Yu, The Middle Kingdom and the Intellectual 
Property World, 13 OR. REV. INT’L L. 209, 229–37 (2011) [hereinafter Yu, Middle 
Kingdom] (discussing China’s low profile in the international intellectual property 
arena). 
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As a newly-acceded Member, China is required to undertake 
a lot of commitments, many of which are more onerous 
than those of existing WTO members. It is already a 
humongous challenge for China to try to implement these 
commitments. After having been in the spotlight for fifteen 
years, what China needs now is some quiet breathing space. 
Shouldering a leadership role would put China back on the 
front stage again and encourage other Members to pressure 
China to make more concessions.39 
Moreover, the experience in the Doha Development Round 
of Trade Negotiations (“Doha Round”) has shown that China is 
unlikely to quickly support standards that exceed what the WTO 
presently requires.40 China has also been the respondent in a 
growing number of WTO complaints, on issues ranging from 
intellectual property enforcement to duties on steel products to 
exports of rare earths.41 Thus, if including China in the TPP 
negotiations would slow down the discussions or create 
deadlocks similar to what the Doha Round now experiences, it 
makes great strategic sense to exclude China from the 
negotiations—or, at least, from the initial stages of these 
negotiations. 
Such exclusion is particularly important, considering the 
significant leverage China can derive from its economic strength 
and vast market. It is also badly needed considering that the 
                                                                                                             
39. Gao, China’s Participation in the WTO, supra note 38, at 70. 
40. See TRIPS Council, Minutes of Meeting ¶¶ 248–63, IP/C/M/63 (Oct. 4, 2010) 
(reporting China’s criticism of the TRIPS-plus enforcement standards established by 
ACTA and other bilateral and regional trade agreements); Tu Xinquan, China’s Position 
and Role in the Doha Round Negotiations, in CHINA AND GLOBAL TRADE GOVERNANCE: 
CHINA’S FIRST DECADE IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, supra note 36 at 167 
(noting that “some Members and observers claim that China is the root cause of the 
WTO’s Doha fiasco”); Peter K. Yu, TRIPS and Its Achilles’ Heel, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 
479, 514–15 (2011) (recounting China’s strong opposition to enforcement-related 
discussions at the TRIPS Council). 
41 . Panel Report, China—Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of 
Intellectual Property Rights, WT/DS362/R (Jan. 26, 2009); Panel Report, China—
Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Duties on Grain Oriented Flat-Rolled Electrical Steel from the 
United States, WT/DS414/R (June 15, 2012); Appellate Body Report, China—
Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Duties on Grain Oriented Flat-Rolled Electrical Steel from the 
United States, WT/DS414/AB/R (Oct. 18, 2012); Panel Report, China—Measures Related 
to the Exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten, and Molybdenu, WT/DS431/R, WT/DS432/R, 
WT/DS433/R (Mar. 26, 2014). 
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United States and other developed and like-minded countries 
are now in need of an alternative international forum. As Mitsuo 
Matsushita, a former member of the WTO Appellate Body, 
reminded us, “the power relationship in the WTO has changed, 
that is, the majority of WTO members today are developing 
countries and they have been successful in rallying their forces 
to act as countervailing powers vis-à-vis the hegemony of 
developed-country Members, such as the United States and the 
European Union.”42 
Although good policy arguments exist to support the 
exclusion of China from the TPP negotiations, especially when 
the focus is on the short term, such exclusion is likely to 
significantly curtail the agreement’s long-term regional impact. 
In fact, if the TPP negotiating parties had made a conscious and 
determined choice to exclude China from the negotiations, it is 
unclear how they could now induce China to join the regional 
pact.43 As I noted in earlier articles in the context of ACTA, 
another plurilateral agreement set up with the ill-advised 
“country club” approach,44 it is instructive to compare joining 
that agreement with joining the WTO, a multilateral trade club 
to which China acceded more than a decade ago. 
In the 1990s and early 2000s, China was very eager to join 
the WTO and accede to the TRIPS Agreement, even though it 
had to revamp a wide array of laws and regulations and agree to 
high WTO-plus standards.45 As Samuel Kim observed at that 
                                                                                                             
42. Mitsuo Matsushita, Japanese Policies Toward East Asian Free Trade Agreements: 
Policy and Legal Perspectives, in CHALLENGES TO MULTILATERAL TRADE: THE IMPACT OF 
BILATERAL, PREFERENTIAL AND REGIONAL AGREEMENTS 41, 42 (Ross Buckley et al. eds., 
2008) [hereinafter CHALLENGES TO MULTILATERAL TRADE]. 
43. But cf. Lewis, TPP and RCEP, supra note 33, at 372–74 (discussing China’s 
statement of interest in regard to the TPP). 
44. For discussions of this approach, see Daniel Gervais, Country Clubs, Empiricism, 
Blogs and Innovation: The Future of International Intellectual Property Norm Making in the 
Wake of ACTA, in TRADE GOVERNANCE IN THE DIGITAL AGE: WORLD TRADE FORUM 323 
(Mira Burri & Thomas Cottier eds., 2012); Peter K. Yu, The ACTA/TPP Country Clubs, in 
ACCESS TO INFORMATION AND KNOWLEDGE: 21ST CENTURY CHALLENGES IN 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND KNOWLEDGE GOVERNANCE 258 (Dana Beldiman ed., 
2014). 
45 . See Samuel S. Kim, China in World Politics, in DOES CHINA MATTER? A 
REASSESSMENT: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF GERALD SEGAL 37, 49 (Barry Buzan & Rosemary 
Foot eds., 2004) (“In a few important areas, China assumed obligations that exceed 
normal WTO standards—the so-called WTO-plus commitments.”); Julia Ya Qin, China, 
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time, China was willing “to gain WTO entry at almost any 
price.”46 The country’s approach was understandable. To many 
Chinese leaders, the WTO membership helped secure China’s 
rightful place in the international community. Even if the 
economic costs were high, the symbolic value of the WTO 
accession and an improved standing in the international 
community would more than compensate for the accession’s 
short-term costs. 
The TPP, however, is not the WTO. It does not give China a 
rightful place in the international community. Nor does TPP 
club membership have any bearing on China’s dignitary 
interests. To be certain, not being allowed to join the TPP could 
cause China to lose face, international reputation, or even soft 
power.47 Nevertheless, whether the exclusion would achieve this 
outcome will depend on whether the TPP is seen as a fair and 
legitimate trade pact. If most countries and members of the 
public consider the TPP an illegitimate attempt to bully the less 
powerful countries into adopting inappropriate standards, the 
exclusion of China from the negotiations will have a very limited 
impact on its dignitary interests, international reputation, and 
soft power. 
Moreover, inclusion in the TPP negotiations does not 
indicate that the possession of high trade standards. Consider, 
for example, the intellectual property standards in the TPP 
Agreement. Although it would be highly unattractive for China 
to be branded as a pirate nation, especially after undertaking so 
                                                                                                             
India and WTO Law, in CHINA, INDIA AND THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 167, 
173–75 (Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah & Wang Jiangyu eds., 2010) (outlining 
China’s “‘WTO-plus’ rules”); Yu, Middle Kingdom, supra note 38, at 224 (“As part of its 
entry price, China took on not only obligations under the TRIPS Agreement but also 
additional WTO-plus commitments.”). 
46. Kim, supra note 45, at 49. 
47. As Derek Mitchell observed: 
[I]nternational condemnation of China’s domestic record on human rights, 
rule of law, political freedom, corruption, and export product safety has 
infuriated Beijing. This is true not only because of traditional Asian notions 
of “losing face” or contentions that it “hurts the feelings of 1.3 billion 
Chinese people,” as the Chinese are wont to say, but also because these 
public criticisms affect China’s international reputation and thus its soft 
power. 
C. FRED BERGSTEN ET AL., CHINA’S RISE: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 216 (2008). 
2014] TPP AND TRANS-PACIFIC PERPLEXITIES 1143 
many legal reforms and enforcement campaigns in the past two 
decades,48 TPP membership is not limited to countries that have 
always respected intellectual property rights. The checkered 
pasts of Japan and the United States speak for themselves.49 
More importantly, as the USTR declared in his latest Section 301 
Report, close to half of the twelve TPP negotiating parties failed 
to adequately protect intellectual property rights. While Chile 
earned the distinction of being on the Priority Watch List, 
Canada, Mexico, Peru, and Vietnam were all on the Watch List.50 
Malaysia was only removed from the Watch List in 2012,51 more 
than a year after the country joined the TPP negotiations.52 
Thus, even under the USTR’s unilateral standards, the TPP 
country club is a den filled with known pirates. 
While it is already highly challenging for the TPP 
negotiating parties to induce China to participate in the 
negotiations or join the agreement after its formation, the pre-
conditions attached to joining the negotiations or the 
agreement have become even more problematic. Most of the 
present negotiating parties simply do not see the agreement as 
                                                                                                             
48. For the Author’s earlier discussions of the Chinese intellectual property 
system, see generally Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners: Protecting Intellectual Property in 
China in the Twenty-First Century, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 131 (2000); Peter K. Yu, From Pirates 
to Partners (Episode II): Protecting Intellectual Property in Post-WTO China, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 
901 (2006); Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property, Economic Development, and the China Puzzle, 
in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT: STRATEGIES TO OPTIMIZE 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN A TRIPS PLUS ERA 173 (Daniel J. Gervais ed., 2007); Yu, 
Middle Kingdom, supra note 38. 
49. As William Kingston noted: 
From the start of the industrial revolution, every country that became 
economically great began by copying: the Germans copied the British; the 
Americans copied the British and the Germans, and the Japanese copied 
everybody. The trust of the TRIPS Agreement is to ensure that this process of 
growth by copying and learning by doing will never happen again. 
William Kingston, An Agenda for Radical Intellectual Property Reform, in INTERNATIONAL 
PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY REGIME 653, 658 (Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman eds., 2005); Peter 
K. Yu, The Global Intellectual Property Order and Its Undetermined Future, 1 WIPO J. 1, 12–
13 (2009) (discussing the United States’ past as a pirate nation). 
50. OFFICE OF THE USTR, 2013 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 2–3 (2013). 
51. See OFFICE OF THE USTR, 2012 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 8 (2012). 
52. Press Release, Ministry of Int’l Trade & Indus. (Malay.), Malaysia Joins TPP 
Agreement Negotiations (Oct. 8, 2010), available at http://www.miti.gov.my/ cms/
content.jsp?id=com.tms.cms.article.Article_8b253a38-c0a81573-f5a0f5a0-d9375f5b. 
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an open pact that Asia-Pacific countries can freely join at any 
stage and under any condition. 53  For example, when Canada, 
Mexico, and Japan requested to join the negotiations, they had 
to agree not to renegotiate chapters that have already achieved 
consensus among the preexisting negotiating parties.54 While 
                                                                                                             
53. As Deborah Elms and Lim Chin Leng observed: 
Although the TPP is being designed to allow other states to join, the entire 
Agreement cannot be renegotiated for each new member. At a certain point, 
the Agreement will have to be closed for new membership—after that, 
economies could still elect to accede, but they would have to accept the deal 
on the table as given (subject, presumably, to minor modifications and 
certain conditions for entry). 
Deborah K. Elms & C.L. Lim, An Overview and Snapshot of the TPP Negotiations, in TRANS-
PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP, supra note 10, at 21, 41–42. But see C.L. Lim et al., What Is “High-
Quality, Twenty-First Century” Anyway?, in TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP, supra note 10, at 
3, 3 [hereinafter Lim et al., “High-Quality, Twenty-First Century”] (“[The TPP] is an 
open-ended agreement that clearly contemplates an expanded membership over 
time.”). To a large extent, one can contrast the TPP with the original P4, which “ha[d] 
an open accession clause [and] encourage[d] other economies to negotiate to accede 
to the agreement.” Lewis, Achieving a FTAAP, supra note 34, at 223, 225; see also C.L. 
Lim, The China-ASEAN Tariff Acceleration Clause, in CHINA, INDIA AND THE 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER, supra note 45, at 427, 439–41 (discussing open 
regionalism); Wang Jiangyu, The Role of China and India in Asian Regionalism, in CHINA, 
INDIA AND THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER, supra note 45, at 333, 374–75 
[hereinafter Wang, Role of China and India] (discussing how China and India should 
lead Asia to practice open regionalism with an Asian identity). 
54. As Inside U.S. Trade reported, Mexico had to accept the following conditions 
in order to join the TPP negotiations: 
 First, Mexico agreed to accept all text on which the nine current TPP 
partners have already reached consensus. That consensus text cannot be 
reopened unless the nine current TPP partners agreed to revisit it, one 
official explained. 
 In addition, Mexico agreed to accept all future text on which the nine 
partners reach consensus during the forthcoming 90-day window. This 
appears to reflect the idea forwarded by some TPP observers earlier this week 
that new entrants like Mexico will not have “veto authority” over the closing 
of some future TPP chapters. 
 Mexico did not have a chance to review the past consensus text that it 
agreed to accept as a condition of entry. Its current understanding is that it 
also will not have access to any texts until it formally enters the talks, meaning 
that it will also have to agree to text to which TPP partners agree during the 
90-day period without getting to review it first. 
Mexico Stresses It Will Be a Full TPP Partner, Despite Terms of Entry, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, 
June 22, 2012. In regard to Canada, Michael Geist wrote: 
1. According to Inside US Trade, the U.S. established two conditions for 
Canadian entry. First, Canada will not be able to reopen any chapters where 
agreement has already been reached among the current nine TPP partners. 
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agreeing to such terms would literally place the late-arriving 
countries as “second class citizens,” this lower status would not 
matter much substantively when most chapters have not yet 
achieved consensus.55 
For countries joining the agreement after its formation, 
however, the impact of being second-class TPP citizens—and 
therefore not having the ability to renegotiate chapters or 
provisions with which they disagree—would be quite significant. 
Given China’s now considerable economic power and 
geopolitical leverage, it is indeed difficult to see why China—or, 
for that matter, other large developing countries like India—
would join an agreement that is filled with rules and standards 
that it had no role in shaping and that it cannot re-negotiate.56 
Gone are the days where trade rules could be created in the 
developed world and then shoved down the throats of large 
developing countries. If China is to eventually become a party to 
the TPP, the negotiating parties will have to make significant 
adjustments to induce the country to join. 
                                                                                                             
The problem with this is that Canada has agreed to this condition without 
actually gaining access to the current TPP text. Has Canada agreed to be 
bound by terms it has not even read? Can it disclose what it has effectively 
agreed to simply by accepting the offer to enter the negotiations? 
2. Inside US Trade also reports that Canada has second tier status in the 
negotiations as the U.S. has stipulated that Canada would not have “veto 
authority” over any chapter. This means that should the other nine countries 
agree on terms, Canada would be required to accept them. Has Canada 
agreed to this condition? How will it deal with the prospect that the other 
nine countries agree to terms that are disadvantageous to Canada? 
Michael Geist, 2nd Tier Status for Canada?: 5 Questions on Canada’s Entry to the Trans 
Pacific Partnership Talks (June 19, 2012), http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/
6547/125; accord Elms, TPP Trade Negotiations, supra note 6, at 372 (“Getting approval 
to participate did not mean . . . that Japan automatically became eligible to see all the 
negotiating texts or to sit in on bargaining at the next round of discussions. Instead, 
Japan was forced to wait for the domestic procedures in each TPP member country to 
be completed before it was allowed to commence discussions with any of them.”); see 
also Capling & Ravenhill, supra note 15, at 290 (“US Trade Representative declared that 
‘potential new entrants must be prepared to address a range of US priorities and 
issues’.”). 
55. See SCHOTT ET AL., supra note 10, at 41 (noting that Canada and Mexico’s 
commitments not to reopen the already “agreed” text is “not an onerous requirement 
since much of what has been completed involves relatively less controversial issues”). 
56. Cf. Peter K. Yu, Six Secret (and Now Open) Fears of ACTA, 64 SMU L. REV. 975, 
1090–91 (2011) [hereinafter Yu, Six Secret Fears] (advancing a similar claim in relation 
to ACTA). 
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Moreover, some of the TPP standards, if adopted as 
reported, would present major challenges to China. A case in 
point is the proposed government procurement standards, 
which would drastically alter the structure and operation of 
state-owned enterprises. As Professor Gao rightly observed: 
[I]f China were to join the TPP Agreement one day, it 
w[ould] have to comply with the discipline on state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs), which have already become a hot issue 
in the current negotiations. However, as SOEs are of great 
political as well as economic significance in China, it would 
be impossible for China to accede to such demands.57 
The TPP’s electronic commerce standards could also deeply 
affect China’s censorship and information control policy.58 This 
issue has become especially sensitive in the trade context 
following China’s losses before both the WTO panel and the 
Appellate Body in China—Measures Affecting Trading Rights and 
Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual 
Entertainment Products.59 
To complicate matters even further, some negotiating 
parties simply do not see the TPP solely as a trade pact. Instead, 
they consider it as an important alliance that helps foster 
regional security.60 Some may have gone even further to view the 
                                                                                                             
57. Henry Gao, From the P4 to the TPP: Transplantation or Transformation, in TRANS-
PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP, supra note 10, at 64, 79 [hereinafter Gao, From the P4 to the TPP]; 
see also Ted Murphy, Government Procurement and Labour Issues, in NO ORDINARY DEAL, 
supra note 10, at 189, 190–95 (discussing the government procurement standards in the 
TPP Agreement). 
58. See Gao, From the P4 to the TPP, supra note 57, at 79–80 (“[R]equests for China 
to remove barriers on e-commerce will meet major resistance from the internet 
censorship regime of China.”). 
59. Panel Report, China—Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services 
for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, WT/DS363/R (Aug. 12, 
2009); Appellate Body Report, China—Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution 
Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, WT/DS363/AB/R 
(Dec. 21, 2009). 
60. See Paul G. Buchanan, Security Implications of the TPPA, in NO ORDINARY DEAL, 
supra note 10, at 82, 87 (“The strategic context in which the proposed TPPA [Trans-
Pacific Partnership Agreement] is being negotiated is one where the People’s Republic 
of China is gradually challenging US military and economic primacy in the Western 
Pacific amid a general military build-up throughout the region.”); Capling & Ravenhill, 
supra note 15, at 292 (“The ‘securitization’ of the TPP is consistent with a recent trend 
in US trade policy to use PTAs to reinforce strategic relationships. This development 
can be dated to the Israel-US free trade agreement of 1985, but it gained momentum 
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TPP as a strategic tool to ward off the threat created by a rapidly-
emerging China, 61  or the so-called “China threat.” 62  It is 
                                                                                                             
after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks when the Bush administration initiated a 
series of [preferential trade agreement] negotiations with countries that were of 
strategic or geopolitical importance to the United States.”); Olivier Cattaneo, The 
Political Economy of PTAs, in BILATERAL AND REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: 
COMMENTARY AND ANALYSIS 28, 42–50 (Simon Lester & Bryan Mercurio eds., 2009) 
[hereinafter BRTA COMMENTARY] (discussing how bilateral and regional agreements 
are instruments of foreign policy that are primarily driven by political considerations); 
Chad Damro, The Political Economy of Regional Trade Agreements, in REGIONAL TRADE 
AGREEMENTS AND THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM 23, 39 (Lorand Bartels & Federico Ortino 
eds., 2007) (“[M]any states enter into RTAs [regional trade agreements] for important 
political, rather than exclusively economic, considerations. In short, states are using 
economic means for political ends.”); see also Kearns, supra note 32, at 145 (“Morocco 
and the US agreed to negotiate an agreement just eight months after the terrorist 
attacks of 11 September 2001. The US was looking to strengthen its relationship with a 
reform-minded Muslim nation in the Middle East—and to provide economic 
opportunities in that region as a way to counter terrorism.”); Andrew D. Mitchell & 
Tania Voon, Australia–United States Free Trade Agreement, in BRTA CASE STUDIES, supra 
note 31, at 6, 8 (“An unofficial suggestion is that the AUSFTA was ‘payback’ for 
Australia’s support of the Iraq war: September 11 may have been what finally led the 
US to agree to the AUSFTA.” (footnote omitted)). 
61. As Paul Buchanan observed: 
[F]or the US, the TPPA has strategic implications beyond trade per se. The 
TPPA would provide the US with a trade-based counterbalance to Chinese 
ambitions as well as a means by which to redress the current soft power 
imbalance that favours the Chinese in the South Western Pacific. Beyond any 
material benefits that accrued, the establishment of a US-led eight-country 
[now twelve-country] trading bloc across the Pacific Rim, with potential to 
expand to other APEC members, would help offset Chinese ‘chequebook 
diplomacy’ as a form of influence and leverage in that part of the world. 
Buchanan, supra note 60, at 89; see also Avery Goldstein, U.S.-China Interactions in Asia, 
in TANGLED TITANS, supra note 13, at 263, 281 (“[W]hen American support for 
realizing the TPP was given a high priority two years later in conjunction with the 
November 2011 [APEC] meeting in Honolulu, the prominence accorded the initiative 
was widely viewed as having a new political significance related to the turbulence in the 
U.S.-China relations during the years following Obama’s 2009 trip to China.”); Lewis, 
Achieving a FTAAP, supra note 34, at 226 (recalling the speech of the chair of the House 
Ways and Means Trade Subcommittee that “the TPP ‘at least begins the process of 
positioning the US as a counterweight to China in the Asia-Pacific Region’”); Jagdish 
Bhagwati, Deadlock in Durban, PROJECT–SYNDICATE (Nov. 30, 2011), http://
www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/deadlock-in-durban (stating that TPP “will 
principally aid countries that are worried about an aggressive China and seek political 
security rather than increase trade”). 
Nevertheless, some countries remain wary about such a strategic approach, 
especially vis-à-vis China. As Ann Capling and John Ravenhill recounted: 
In November, it was reported that Australia and New Zealand: “have had to 
communicate to key figures supporting the TPP [in Washington] in no 
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therefore understandable why some TPP negotiating parties 
would have second thoughts about admitting China into the 
regional pact. 
When all of these factors are taken together, it is no 
surprise that China remains outside the TPP and will likely 
continue to be so in the near future. Nevertheless, its outsider 
status is likely to create problems not only for the TPP, but also 
more broadly for the Asia-Pacific region and the global 
economy. To begin with, many commentators believe that the 
TPP needs to include China if it is to have long-term regional 
success. As Lim Chin Leng, Deborah Elms, and Patrick Low 
observed: 
If the ultimate goal of the TPP is to expand to the FTAAP, 
then the TPP will have to include China. If the TPP is 
serious about expanding trade cooperation in the Asia-
Pacific, then the TPP ought to include China at some point 
in the future. This is not to say that China needs to 
participate in the negotiations at this initial stage. But it is to 
suggest that China’s involvement should be planned for and 
that steps should be taken to make it more—and not less—
likely that China will join in the future.63 
At the regional and multilateral levels, excluding China 
from the TPP negotiations could also have serious implications 
for both trade and regulation. As Avery Goldstein observed: 
                                                                                                             
uncertain terms that the moment New Zealand and Australia smell a China 
containment policy, they are ‘gone’ from the negotiations”. Such views are 
likely to be shared by other TPP members that have important trade, 
investment and political relationships with China, and who do not want these 
to be held hostage to US foreign policy concerns. 
Capling & Ravenhill, supra note 15, at 293. 
62. For discussions of the so-called China threat, see generally CHINA’S FUTURE: 
CONSTRUCTIVE PARTNER OR EMERGING THREAT (Ted Galen Carpenter & James A. 
Dorn eds., 2000); BILL GERTZ, THE CHINA THREAT: HOW THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC 
TARGETS AMERICA (2000); STEVEN M. MOSHER, HEGEMON: CHINA’S PLAN TO DOMINATE 
ASIA AND THE WORLD (2000); PETER NAVARRO, THE COMING CHINA WARS: WHERE THEY 
WILL BE FOUGHT AND HOW THEY CAN BE WON (2007). 
63. C.L. Lim et al., Conclusion, in TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP, supra note 10, at 
319, 325; see SCHOTT ET AL., supra note 10, at 55 (“It is hard to conceive of a 
comprehensive Asia-Pacific trade arrangement that does not eventually include 
China.”); Lewis, Achieving a FTAAP, supra note 34, at 235 (“[I]t . . . does not seem 
realistic that in the long-term there will be an FTAAP that does not include China.”). 
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Suspicious of U.S. intentions, China might have been 
expected to reconsider the usefulness of regional 
organizations that, since the mid-1990s, it had seen as 
venues for reassuring nervous neighbors. If they were 
instead becoming settings in which others could gang up on 
China or act as fronts for American efforts to check China’s 
rise (as Beijing had feared in the early 1990s), their appeal 
would diminish.64 
To be certain, Chinese leaders, especially those nationalistic 
ones, may consider it offensive for China to be left out of the 
TPP negotiations. However, it is also plausible that they see the 
exclusion as a blessing in disguise. Because China continues to 
struggle with a wide variety of internal problems, its leaders may 
not be convinced that the country is ready for further trade 
liberalization under the TPP. Moreover, China has always taken 
a strong sovereignty-based position that resists international 
intervention in domestic affairs.65 From this perspective alone, 
the more the TPP negotiations weaken the existing multilateral 
system, the stronger China’s arguments against multilateral 
intervention will be in the future. 
Finally, China has been actively negotiating its own version 
of bilateral, plurilateral, and regional trade and investment 
agreements just as the TPP is being developed.66 Since the mid-
                                                                                                             
64. Goldstein, supra note 61, at 282. 
65. See Adama Gaye, China in Africa: After the Gun and the Bible . . . A West African 
Perspective, in CHINA RETURNS TO AFRICA: A RISING POWER AND A CONTINENT EMBRACE 
129, 138 (Chris Alden et al. eds., 2008) [hereinafter CHINA RETURNS TO AFRICA] (“‘We 
don’t believe that human rights should be above sovereignty issues . . . .’” (quoting He 
Wenping, Director of Africa Department of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences)); 
Shalmali Guttal, Client and Competitor: China and International Financial Institutions, in 
CHINA’S NEW ROLE IN AFRICA AND THE SOUTH: A SEARCH FOR A NEW PERSPECTIVE 17, 32 
(Dorothy-Grace Guerrero & Firoze Manji eds., 2008) [hereinafter CHINA’S NEW ROLE] 
(“What China argues for is the sovereign rights of governments to shape their own 
development strategies and to make decisions about projects and policies regardless of 
social, environmental and governance implications.”); Denis M. Tull, The Political 
Consequences of China’s Return to Africa, in CHINA RETURNS TO AFRICA, supra, at 111, 118 
(noting that “unconditional respect for national sovereignty [that] makes any attempt 
to interfere into the domestic affairs of a state illegitimate”). 
66. For discussions of these developments, see generally Henry Gao, The RTA 
Strategy of China: A Critical Visit, in CHALLENGES TO MULTILATERAL TRADE, supra note 
42, at 53; Marc Lanteigne, Northern Exposure: Cross-Regionalism and the China-Iceland 
Preferential Trade Negotiations, 202 CHINA Q. 362 (2010); Wang, Role of China and India, 
supra note 53; Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements, supra note 31. 
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2000s, China has successfully negotiated bilateral agreements 
with Chile, Pakistan, New Zealand, Singapore, Peru, Costa Rica, 
Iceland, and Switzerland, including four of the twelve TPP 
negotiating parties. 67  China is also negotiating a free trade 
agreement with Australia.68 In addition, China has developed 
the ASEAN–China Free Trade Area with Brunei Darussalam, 
Malaysia, Vietnam, and other members of the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).69 Included in many of these 
agreements is an “Early Harvest Program,” whose generous 
trade terms have greatly improved China’s regional reputation.70 
It is therefore no surprise that Joshua Kurlantzick described 
these programs as part of the country’s “charm offensive.”71 
In November 2012, China, India, members of ASEAN, and 
other key Asia-Pacific neighbors also launched the negotiation 
of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
(“RCEP”).72 Building on past trade and non-trade discussions 
under the ASEAN+6 framework (Australia, China, India, Japan, 
New Zealand, and South Korea), this new regional partnership 
will cover not only the two most powerful middle-income 
countries in the Asia-Pacific region (China and India), but also 
two advanced Asian economies (Japan and South Korea) as well 
as seven of the TPP negotiating parties.73 
                                                                                                             
67. The texts of the agreements are available at http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn. 
68. See China-Australia FTA, CHINA FTA NETWORK, http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/
topic/enaustralia.shtml (last visited Sept. 13, 2013) (providing updates on the 
negotiations). 
69. For discussions of ASEAN-China Free Trade Area, see Wang, ACFTA, supra 
note 31, at 224; Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements, supra note 31, at 1007–09. 
70. See Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements, supra note 31, at 996–97 (discussing these 
programs). 
71 . JOSHUA KURLANTZICK, CHARM OFFENSIVE: HOW CHINA’S SOFT POWER IS 
TRANSFORMING THE WORLD (2007); see also THOMAS LUM ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., RL 34310, CHINA’S “SOFT POWER” IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (2008) (discussing China’s 
growing use of soft power in Southeast Asia). 
72. Press Release, ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN and FTA Partners Launch the 
World’s Biggest Regional Free Trade Deal, Nov. 20, 2012, http://www.asean.org/
news/asean-secretariat-news/item/asean-and-fta-partners-launch-the-world-s-biggest-
regional-free-trade-deal; see also Lewis, TPP and RCEP, supra note 33, at 363–62 
(discussing the RCEP). 
73. See Lewis, Achieving a FTAAP, supra note 34, at 227–29 (discussing possible 
avenues for Asian economic integration, including ASEAN+3, ASEAN+6 and APEC); see 
also MARK BEESON, REGIONALISM AND GLOBALIZATION IN EAST ASIA: POLITICS, SECURITY 
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Thus, if China considers the TPP a foreign policy 
instrument initiated by the United States and other like-minded 
countries to isolate or contain the country, it may greatly 
accelerate the development of these alternative regimes. This 
scenario is not unforeseeable considering that many countries in 
the Asia-Pacific region remain reluctant to pick between China 
and the United States despite their concern about China’s 
growing economic and military strengths. As David Shambaugh 
pointed out: 
[H]aving to choose between Beijing and Washington as a 
primary benefactor is the nightmare scenario for the vast 
majority of Asian states . . . . It is not an exaggeration that 
all Asian states seek to have sound, extensive, and 
cooperative relations with both the United States and China, 
and thus will do much to avoid being put into a bipolar 
dilemma.74 
In sum, the exclusion of China from the TPP negotiations 
has raised questions regarding the agreement’s benefits, 
significance, and viability. The exclusion has also created 
complications and perplexities concerning the future 
development of bilateral, plurilateral, and regional trade and 
investment agreements in the Asia-Pacific Region. For better or 
worse, the TPP negotiations could initiate and accelerate the 
development of a new set of nonmultilateral agreements that 
further undermine the international regulatory environment 
and multilateral trading system. 
II. BRICS AND OTHER EMERGING COUNTRIES 
The second group of “TPP outsiders” consists of fast-
growing, emerging middle-income economies in the Asia-Pacific 
                                                                                                             
AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 232–36 (2007) [hereinafter BEESON, REGIONALISM AND 
GLOBALIZATION] (discussing ASEAN+3). 
74. David Shambaugh, Introduction: The Rise of China and Asia’s New Dynamics, in 
POWER SHIFT: CHINA AND ASIA’S NEW DYNAMICS 1, 17 (David Shambaugh ed., 2006) 
[hereinafter POWER SHIFT]; accord Ellen L. Frost, China’s Commercial Diplomacy in Asia: 
Promise or Threat?, in CHINA’S RISE AND THE BALANCE OF INFLUENCE IN ASIA 95, 105 
(William W. Keller & Thomas G. Rawski eds., 2007) (noting that Asian countries “do 
not wish to be forced to choose between Beijing and Washington”). 
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region, including the so-called BRICS countries.75 Coined in 
2001 for a group of high-growth developing countries by Jim 
O’Neill, Goldman Sachs’s then-chief global economist, the term 
“BRICs” initially referred to Brazil, Russia, India, and China.76 
Since then, this rapidly popularized term has been generalized 
to cover other emerging middle-income countries, including 
South Africa 77  and what O’Neill and his associates have 
described as “N-11” (Next 11) countries78 and later “growth 
markets.”79 
These fast-growing, emerging middle-income economies 
are important because these countries are likely to provide the 
most significant growth in the near future. As two Goldman 
Sachs global economists noted in a study entitled Dreaming with 
BRICs: The Path to 2050,80 the economies of Brazil, Russia, India, 
                                                                                                             
75. See generally Peter K. Yu, The Middle Intellectual Property Powers, in LAW AND 
DEVELOPMENT IN MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRIES: AVOIDING THE MIDDLE-INCOME TRAP 84 
(Tom Ginsburg & Randall Peerenboom eds., 2014) (discussing intellectual property 
developments in large middle-income economies). 
76. See JIM O’NEILL, GOLDMAN SACHS, BUILDING BETTER GLOBAL ECONOMIC 
BRICS (Goldman Sachs, Global Economics Paper No. 66, 2001), available at 
http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/archive/archive-pdfs/build-better-
brics.pdf. 
77 . See, e.g., CHIDI OGUAMANAM, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN GLOBAL 
GOVERNANCE: THE CRISIS OF EQUITY IN THE NEW KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 221–22 (2012) 
(expanding the definition of the BRICS countries to cover other emerging middle-
income economies); Peter K. Yu, Access to Medicines, BRICS Alliances, and Collective 
Action, 34 AM. J.L. & MED. 345, 346 (2008) [hereinafter Yu, Access to Medicines] 
(expanding the BRICS acronym to cover South Africa); Sebastien Hervieu, South Africa 
Gains Entry to BRIC Club, GUARDIAN WKLY. (Apr. 19, 2011, 9:04 AM), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/apr/19/south-africa-joins-bric-club 
(reporting about the South African president joining his counterparts from Brazil, 
Russia, India, and China for the third summit meeting of the informal group in 
China). 
78. See JIM O’NEILL ET AL., GOLDMAN SACHS, HOW SOLID ARE THE BRICS? 7–8 
(Goldman Sachs, Global Economics Paper No. 134, 2005), available at http://
www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/archive/archive-pdfs/how-solid.pdf (advancing 
the concept of the N-11 countries in response to questions concerning whether more 
“BRICs” are out there). The N-11 countries are Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, 
Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines, South Korea, Turkey, and Vietnam. Id. at 7. 
79. See JIM O’NEILL, THE GROWTH MAP: ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY IN THE BRICS 
AND BEYOND (2011) (providing an up-to-date analysis of the BRICs and what O’Neill 
now terms “growth markets”). 
80. DOMINIC WILSON & ROOPA PURUSHOTHAMAN, GOLDMAN SACHS, DREAMING 
WITH BRICS: THE PATH TO 2050 (Goldman Sachs, Global Economics Paper No. 99), 
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and China are likely to overtake those of many existing 
developed economies by 2050: 
[I]n less than 40 years, the BRICs’ economies together 
could be larger than the G6 in US dollar terms. By 2025 
they could account for over half the size of the G6. 
Currently they are worth less than 15% . . . . Of the 
current G6 (US, Japan, Germany, France, Italy, UK) only 
the US and Japan may be among the six largest economies 
in US dollar terms in 2050.81 
If a key goal of the TPP is to open up new or fast-growing 
markets, it seems rather ill-advised and short-sighted to exclude 
all of these high-growth economies from the negotiations. As 
commentators rightly observed, the present lineup in the TPP 
negotiations does not provide the United States—or, for that 
matter, other negotiating parties—with a lot of trade benefits.82 
Thus, if the TPP is to have a larger regional economic impact, it 
has to grow to include other Asia-Pacific countries. As Sebastian 
Herreros declared: 
Ultimately, the TPP will have to expand to include large, 
mostly Asian economies, to be a meaningful exercise. Its 
current commercial appeal is very modest, given the small 
size of most participating economies. More importantly, an 
agreement limited to the . . . nine [and now twelve] 
participants would be far from a credible platform for large-
scale trans-Pacific economic integration.83 
                                                                                                             
available at http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/archive/archive-pdfs/brics-
dream.pdf. 
81. Id. at 4. 
82. See Jane Kelsey, Introduction to NO ORDINARY DEAL, supra note 10, at 10, 18 
(“[M]ost of the participating economies are of limited regional importance in Asia and 
the Pacific Rim or to the US.”). 
83. Sebastian Herreros, Coping with Multiple Uncertainties: Latin America in the TPP 
Negotiations, in TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP, supra note 10, at 260, 274; accord Lewis, 
Achieving a FTAAP, supra note 34, at 226 (“[T]he United States’ interest in the 
Agreement was clearly tied to its potential to expand. This remains the case today, as 
the other countries that have joined the negotiation also provide little in the way of 
new market access opportunities for the US.”); Kimberlee Weatherall, The TPP as a 
Case Study of Changing Dynamics for International Intellectual Property Negotiations, in 
TRADE LIBERALISATION AND INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION, supra note 10, at 50, 60 
(“[T]he economic benefits of a TPP between the negotiating parties would be limited; 
only if bigger regional economies participate, such as India, South Korea, and China, 
will these negotiations generate a real payoff.”). 
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Obviously, the issues I raised earlier in regard to China are 
applicable to other BRICS countries. Consider, for example, 
India, the world’s second most populous country and the fourth 
largest economy in the Asia-Pacific region (behind only the 
United States, China, and Japan). Like China, India has “the 
potential to redefine the balance of influence and power within 
any grouping of which they are a part and the very definition of 
the region any new institution claims to represent.”84 India’s 
emerging role in Asia is so important that some East Asian 
countries have welcomed India into the East Asian Summit in an 
effort to “provide a ‘hedge’ against Chinese dominance.”85 
Many policymakers and commentators have also linked 
China and India together when exploring the future 
development of the Asia-Pacific region. As Singapore’s Senior 
Minister Goh Chok Tong declared: 
I like to think of new Asia as a mega jumbo jet that is being 
constructed. Northeast Asia, comprising China, Japan and 
South Korea, forms one wing with a powerful engine. India, 
the second wing, will also have a powerful engine. The 
Southeast Asian countries form the fuselage. Even if we lack 
a powerful engine for growth among the 10 [ASEAN] 
countries, we will be lifted by the two wings.86 
Some commentators—most notably Pete Engardio, the Asia 
correspondent for Business Week—even used the term “Chindia” 
to underscore the growing global importance of these two 
emerging trade powers.87 
                                                                                                             
84 . MARK BEESON, INSTITUTIONS OF THE ASIA–PACIFIC: ASEAN, APEC AND 
BEYOND 88 (2008) [hereinafter BEESON, INSTITUTIONS OF THE ASIA–PACIFIC]; see 
ROBERT KAGAN, THE RETURN OF HISTORY AND THE END OF DREAMS 41 (2009) (“In Asia 
. . . it is a three-way, not a two-way, competition [referring to the competition between 
China, India, and the United States].”); see also BILL EMMOTT, RIVALS: HOW THE POWER 
STRUGGLE BETWEEN CHINA, INDIA, AND JAPAN WILL SHAPE OUR NEXT DECADE (2009) 
(discussing the power struggle between China, India, and Japan in Asia). 
85. BEESON, INSTITUTIONS OF THE ASIA–PACIFIC, supra note 84, at 88. 
86 . Goh Chok Tong, Senior Minister, Republic of Sing., Global City of 
Opportunity, Keynote Address at the Singapore Conference in London (Mar. 15, 
2005), available at http://www.mfa.gov.sg/content/mfa/overseasmission/pretoria/
press_statements_speeches/2005/200503/press_200503_01.html. 
87. For discussions of China, India, and the so-called “Chindia,” see generally 
ASIA’S GIANTS: COMPARING CHINA AND INDIA (Edward Friedman & Bruce Gilley eds., 
2008); CHINDIA: HOW CHINA AND INDIA ARE REVOLUTIONIZING GLOBAL BUSINESS (Pete 
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Like China, if India is not involved in the TPP negotiations, 
it is hard to imagine what incentives the TPP negotiating parties 
could provide to induce this country to join the agreement after 
its formation. To be certain, India is not an APEC member, even 
though it did request to join the organization.88 Nevertheless, 
India has been actively establishing bilateral and regional 
agreements with other trading partners, including members of 
ASEAN. 89  India is also currently negotiating an economic 
partnership agreement with the European Union, a trading bloc 
with size and strength comparable to those of the United 
                                                                                                             
Engardio ed., 2006); DANCING WITH GIANTS: CHINA, INDIA, AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 
(L. Alan Winters & Shahid Yusuf eds., 2007); ROBYN MEREDITH, THE ELEPHANT AND 
THE DRAGON: THE RISE OF INDIA AND CHINA AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR ALL OF US 
(2007); JAIRAM RAMESH, MAKING SENSE OF CHINDIA: REFLECTIONS ON CHINA AND INDIA 
(2006). 
88. See BEESON, INSTITUTIONS OF THE ASIA–PACIFIC, supra note 84, at 88 (noting 
that “India has already tried without success to gain entry to APEC”). 
89. As Ellen Frost observed: 
The Indian government has negotiated a framework agreement with ASEAN 
whose ambition and scope resemble the China-ASEAN agreement. It has also 
negotiated an economic cooperation agreement with Singapore, which could 
be a launching pad of sorts for an India-ASEAN FTA. An FTA with Thailand 
is also joining the list. Thanks to these and other diplomatic efforts, New 
Delhi now holds its own annual summit meeting with ASEAN in an 
“ASEAN+1” arrangement, and India was included in the December 2005 East 
Asian Summit. 
Frost, supra note 74, at 99 (footnote omitted); Wang, Role of China and India, supra note 
53, at 365 (“India might have a stronger incentive for an Asian Economic Community, 
as India will relatively gain more benefits from a pan-Asian free trade arrangement. 
However, it is not easy to convince China to sincerely endorse such an idea.”); see also 
Locknie Hsu, China, India and Dispute Settlement in the WTO and RTAs, in CHINA, INDIA 
AND THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER, supra note 45, at 250, 266–68 (discussing 
the South Asian Free Trade Area, the Comprehensive Economic Cooperation 
Agreement Between India and Singapore, India’s FTAs with Sri Lanka and Bhutan, the 
India-MERCOSUR Preference Trade Agreement, and the Agreement on South Asian 
Free Trade Area); Chia & Soesastro, supra note 32, at 212–13 (discussing the ASEAN-
India Comprehensive Economic Cooperation); Wang, Role of China and India, supra 
note 53, at 356–58 (discussing India’s regional trade initiatives). But see TAY, supra note 
12, at 64 (“India, in many ways, is new to East Asia. While its economy is growing, it is 
not fully integrated with the rest of East Asia, and not as central as others. It has 
negotiated a free trade agreement with ASEAN, but this was subject to much haggling 
that showed not just economic differences but also that India has not observed and 
absorbed the social norms prevailing in ASEAN, and perhaps does not want to. As a 
result, India remains peripheral relative to others.”). 
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States. 90  If these negotiations are not enough, India was 
instrumental in the development of the India-Brazil-South Africa 
Dialogue Forum (IBSA), which features trilateral cooperation 
among Brazil, India, and South Africa.91 It is also one of the five 
key participants of the BRICS Summit. 92  If all of these 
developments become fruitful, India will be able to diversify its 
trade portfolio away from reliance on the regional market 
covered by the TPP. 
Apart from India (and Russia, the other BRICS country in 
the Asia-Pacific region), the same analysis can be extended, 
perhaps to a lesser extent, to other large developing countries in 
the region, such as Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, and 
South Korea93 (although the last two countries have expressed 
interest in joining the negotiations94). To some extent, the 
exclusion of the BRICS and other fast-growing, emerging 
middle-income countries has raised a difficult and 
                                                                                                             
90. See Patralekha Chatterjee, Leaked IP Chapter of India-EU FTA Shows TRIPS-Plus 
Pitfalls for India, Expert Says, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Mar. 12, 2013, 5:35 PM), 
http://www.ip-watch.org/2013/03/12/leaked-ip-chapter-of-india-eu-fta-shows-trips-
plus-pitfalls-for-india-expert-says/ (reporting about the leaked draft text of the 
intellectual property chapter of the India–European Union Free Trade Agreement). 
91. As stated in IBSA’s website: 
Established in June 2003, IBSA is a coordinating mechanism amongst three 
emerging countries, three multiethnic and multicultural democracies, which 
are determined to: 
x contribute to the construction of a new international architecture  
x bring their voice together on global issues  
x deepen their ties in various areas. 
IBSA also opens itself to concrete projects of cooperation and partnership 
with less developed countries. 
IBSA Trilateral Official Website: About IBSA Background, http://www.ibsa-trilateral.org/
about-ibsa/background (last visited Mar. 29, 2014). 
92. See Hervieu, supra note 77. 
93. Cf. Lim et al., Conclusion, supra note 63, at 323 (“[E]very clause in the 
Agreement must be negotiated with at least one eye on potential future members . . . . 
It is not simply Viet Nam that must be accommodated in the TPP, but other countries 
like the Philippines and Papua New Guinea.”). 
94. See South Korea Moves Closer to Joining TPP Trade Talks, REUTERS (Nov. 29, 2013, 
4:47 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/29/us-korea-trade-tpp-idUSBRE9
AS06M20131129 (reporting that the South Korean government “said it would make a 
final decision on whether to formally join the [TPP] based on the outcome of talks with 
the member countries”); Thailand Says to Join Trans-Pacific Partnership Trade Talks, 
REUTERS (Nov. 18, 2012, 7:29 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/18/us-
asia-obama-trade-idUSBRE8AH06R20121118 (reporting Thai Prime Minister Yingluck 
Shinawatra stating that Thailand would join the TPP negotiations). 
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diplomatically perplexing question concerning why the TPP 
negotiations have included some developing countries in the 
region while ignoring other more qualified ones. From the 
current list of twelve countries, it is indeed hard to divine the 
logic behind the countries chosen to negotiate the TPP, other 
than historical legacy and the self-interested preferences of the 
more powerful negotiating parties. 95  This lack of easily 
discernible logic becomes particularly problematic when viewed 
against the background of frequent, vocal complaints about the 
double standard in US foreign policy toward Asia-Pacific 
countries. 96  The hard-to-explain negotiating lineup also has 
greatly affected the dynamics of the TPP negotiations.97 
                                                                                                             
95. See Buchanan, supra note 60, at 82 (“[T]he impact on multilateral trade of the 
growing strategic competition between the US and China in the Western Pacific may 
have a significant influence on the way in which TPP expansion is approached by the 
actors involved.”). 
96. As Kishore Mahbubani, Singapore’s former Permanent Representative to the 
United Nations, observed: 
The regime in Myanmar overturned the results of the democratic elections in 
1990 and brutally suppressed the popular demonstrations that followed. 
Myanmar was punished with Western sanctions. Asian governments were 
criticised for not enthusiastically following suit. 
 The regime in Algeria overturned the results of the democratic elections in 
1992 and brutally suppressed the popular demonstrations that followed. 
Algeria was not punished with Western sanctions. The Asian governments 
have never been provided with an explanation for this obvious double 
standard. 
KISHORE MAHBUBANI, CAN ASIANS THINK? 87 (4th ed. 2009). Likewise, Mark Beeson 
wrote: 
As the most prominent and influential champion of global democratic 
reform, the USA plays an especially critical role in placing reformist pressure 
on some of the governments of the region. In this regard, it is important to 
note that the USA’s concern about human rights abuses and the importance 
of democratic procedures is highly selective, and determined by a wider 
strategic calculus. Consequently China, which is still viewed primarily as a 
strategic competitor, a challenger for regional influence, and associated with 
major trade imbalances, is subjected to much hectoring about its human 
rights record. By contrast, because of the war on terror, the USA has taken a 
much more indulgent view of human rights abuses and non-democratic 
processes in countries such as Thailand and Malaysia, which have cracked 
down on supposedly subversive elements or discouraged radical Islamism. 
BEESON, REGIONALISM AND GLOBALIZATION, supra note 73, at 138. A former Chinese 
finance minister went even further to suggest that the US foreign policy had “a triple 
standard”: “For their own human rights problems they shut their eyes . . . . For some 
other countries’ human rights questions they open one eye and shut the other. And for 
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If one goes back to the “P3,” the TPP’s predecessor, the 
choice of the negotiating parties is not hard to discern. Chile, 
New Zealand, and Singapore all have small markets with highly 
liberalized trade sectors.98 Based on World Bank indicators in 
2002, the year the P3 was established, these countries had a 
gross domestic product of approximately 71, 65, and 92 billion, 
respectively.99 Their location on three different continents also 
made the P3 an attractive vehicle to provide entry points into 
regional networks.100 As the number of TPP negotiating parties 
                                                                                                             
China, they open both eyes and stare.” Thomas L. Friedman, Deal with China Urged by 
Bentsen, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1994, at A20 (quoting Chinese Finance Minister Liu 
Zhongli). 
97. As Henry Gao observed in regard to Brunei Darussalam: 
[T]he Brunei market is too small and insignificant for the other parties. If we 
look at the negotiating history of the P4 Agreement, we can see that the talks 
were interrupted several times due to the reluctance of Chile. While there 
might be real political difficulties at home, such reluctance on the side of 
Chile, coupled with eagerness on the side of New Zealand, gave Chile more 
bargaining power in the process and that is why Chile, from a mercantilist 
point of view, got much more than the other parties in the final Agreement. 
This sets a rather bad example for the other potential members: if the P4 
Agreement cannot even handle the pressure from a country that is at best a 
regional power, how can it deal with the pressure from a superpower like the 
US? 
Gao, From the P4 to the TPP, supra note 57, at 72. 
98. See Chia & Soesastro, supra note 32, at 222–23 (noting that the P4 members 
“are among the most open economies in the Pacific”). 
99. Data: GDP (Current US$), WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?page=2 (last visited Feb. 12, 2012). 
100. As I explained in an earlier article: 
Strategically, FTAs and EPAs provide important entry points into other 
regional or plurilateral networks. In doing so, they allow developed countries 
to explore interstate relationships with a smaller number of countries. Such 
an arrangement helps reduce the complexity and high costs of negotiation 
with a large number of parties or a complex regional body. The negotiation 
of the agreements also helps countries test the feasibility of applying specific 
models to a particular region. In fact, because the agreements involve self-
selected parties, they allow parties to avoid negotiation of issues that would 
require them to make concessions that are important to their domestic 
constituencies. The exclusion of issues will also quicken the negotiation 
process, as those issues tend to slow down, if not derail, the negotiations. 
Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements, supra note 31, at 970–71; see also Sidney Weintraub, Lessons 
from the Chile and Singapore Free Trade Agreements, in FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS: US 
STRATEGIES AND PRIORITIES 79, 79 (Jeffrey J. Schott ed., 2004) (noting that the United 
States’ free trade agreements with Chile and Singapore were “intended to be 
bellwethers for future FTAs in both regions, some bilateral and others plurilateral, as 
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grows, however, it has become increasingly difficult to separate 
the insiders from the outsiders based on economic size, trade 
patterns, or sectors that are targeted for trade liberalization (see 
TABLE 1).101 
 
TABLE 1. Exports and Imports in World Merchandise Trade in 2012102 
 
Country Exports (US$B) Imports (US$B) 
Australia 257 261 
Brunei Darussalam 13 4 
Canada 455 475 
Chile 78 79 
Japan 799 886 
Malaysia 227 197 
Mexico 371 380 
New Zealand 37 38 
Peru 46 43 
Singapore 408 380 
United States 1546 2336 
Vietnam 115 114 
                                                                                                             
well as to set the substantive parameters for the hemispherewide Free Trade Area of the 
Americas”). 
101. As Lim Chin Leng, Deborah Elms, and Patrick Low observed: 
One of the unusual elements of the TPP is the fact that members of the TPP 
represent a range of economic development, from the world’s largest 
economy to a lower middle income economy. While members have been 
clear that the TPP will not have any sort of “two speed” or explicit special and 
differential (S&D) treatment for developing country members, it is true that 
the final Agreement will need to have some provisions to account for the 
developmental aspects of some members. 
Lim et al., “High-Quality, Twenty-First Century,” supra note 53, at 12. 
102. WORLD TRADE ORG., INTERNATIONAL TRADE STATISTICS 2013, at 24 (2013); 
Trade Profiles: Brunei Darussalam, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://stat.wto.org/
CountryProfile/WSDBCountryPFView.aspx?Language=E&Country=BN (last visited 
Apr. 21, 2014). 
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To make matters more complicated, the sectors that 
countries seek to liberalize through trade agreements vary 
significantly even within the developing world. Consider the 
difference between India and Brazil. Although Brazil’s 
geographical location will likely preclude it from participating in 
the TPP negotiations or joining the agreement after its 
formation, the comparison between these two BRICS countries 
is highly instructive.103 As Professor Cho noted in relation to the 
complex positions the G-20 countries took during the Fifth 
WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancún, “while India still wants 
to protect domestic agricultural industries, Brazil, a member of 
the Cairns Group consisting of agricultural product exporters, 
wants to further liberalize trade in this area.”104 Likewise, Sonia 
Rolland observed: 
Brazil had a liberal approach to further its export interest, 
whereas India maintained conservative positions with 
respect to liberalization of the agriculture sector and had a 
protectionist stance. Brazil’s shift toward a more aggressive 
stance on agriculture corresponded to its liberalization of 
the agricultural sector and the increased pressure by 
                                                                                                             
103. It is also worth noting that the ASEAN+6 countries “accounted for 28 percent 
of Brazilian exports and 32 percent of its imports in 2010.” Herreros, supra note 83, at 
275. 
104. Cho, supra note 27, at 236; see also Jean Touscoz, A Changing Policy Landscape, 
in INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: THE ORIGINS AND AFTERMATH OF THE 
UNITED NATIONS NEGOTIATIONS ON A DRAFT CODE OF CONDUCT 287, 288 (Surendra J. 
Patel et al. eds., 2001) (“[T]he ‘big five’ non-members of OECD (Russia, China, Brazil, 
India and Indonesia) do not always act in concert; the least developed countries 
themselves do not present a common front.”). As Simon Tay elaborated: 
The G-20 is primarily designed on power rather than norms. While this is a 
concern in many other regions, the question of power is especially tense in 
Asia, where small and medium-sized countries that are open to the global 
economy have sought to work alongside larger countries. Many of the Asian 
forms of cooperation have emphasized equality, in contrast to the underlying 
G-20 principle of size and power. If the Asians who are in the G-20 try to 
dictate to the others in the region, this would conflict with the existing 
forums and norms of intra-Asian cooperation. This is especially true in 
finance and trade, which involve questions of competition and different 
interests between countries. To focus on power in Asia will also probably 
sharpen differences. Rivalries among the Asian members of the G-20 will 
simmer and could boil over. 
TAY, supra note 12, at 166. 
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domestic investors on the government on this issue both in 
negotiating rounds and in dispute settlement (particularly 
in disputes with Europe and the United States).105 
Thus, even though policymakers and commentators often 
focus on the dichotomy between developed and developing 
countries, serious and complicated variations exist in the 
positions taken by the latter in both multilateral and 
nonmultilateral fora. In certain sectors, such as intellectual 
property, the main dividing line is not often drawn across the 
stage of economic development. Rather, it concerns the 
country’s propensity to export intellectual property-based goods 
and services or economic reliance on such exports.106 Although 
the United States has greatly benefited from the TRIPS 
Agreement and the international intellectual property system, 
the same cannot be said of all members of the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”).107 
If the divergent positions taken by developing countries in 
relation to their export sectors have raised complications, the 
inclusion of non-trade issues, such as environmental and labor 
standards, has posed even greater problems.108 Consider, for 
example, my hometown Hong Kong, an APEC member that has 
not yet joined the TPP, but has entered into a closer economic 
                                                                                                             
105. Sonia E. Rolland, Developing Country Coalitions at the WTO: In Search of Legal 
Support, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 483, 495 (2007). 
106. Cf. Susan Corbett, Regulation for Cultural Heritage Orphans: Time Does Matter, 1 
WIPO J. 180, 181 (2010) (making the distinction between “countries which are net-
importers of copyright works . . . [and] the net-copyright exporting countries, such as 
the United States and the United Kingdom”). 
107. See J. Michael Finger, The Doha Agenda and Development: A View from the 
Uruguay Round 11 (Asia Development Bank, ERD Working Paper Series No. 21, 2002), 
available at http://www.adb.org/documents/ERD/Working_Papers/wp021.pdf 
(providing a table documenting changes of net annual patent rent obligations resulting 
from the full application of the TRIPS Agreement). 
108. See generally Lorand Bartels, Social Issues: Labour, Environment and Human 
Rights, in BRTA COMMENTARY, supra note 60, at 342 (discussing the labor and 
environmental standards in the TPP Agreement); Kimberly Ann Elliott, Labour 
Standards and the TPP, in TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP, supra note 10, at 200 (discussing 
the labor standards in the TPP Agreement); Murphy, supra note 57, at 195–97 
(discussing those standards); Jeffrey J. Schott & Julia Muir, Environmental Issues in the 
TPP, in TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP, supra note 10, at 187 (discussing the 
environmental standards in the TPP Agreement). 
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partnership agreement with New Zealand109 and a free trade 
agreement with Chile. 110  Hong Kong has been ranked the 
world’s freest economy for the past two decades since the 
inception of the Index of Economic Freedom, published 
annually by the Wall Street Journal and the Heritage 
Foundation.111 While the region’s heavy emphasis on economic 
freedom has led it to welcome the TPP’s trade liberalization 
goals, that same emphasis has made it somewhat reluctant to 
embrace the agreement’s labor and environmental standards. As 
important as these standards are, they could easily jeopardize 
Hong Kong’s reputation as the world’s freest economy. 
To complicate matters even further, many countries in the 
Asia-Pacific region have highly uneven economic and 
technological developments. As a result, they harbor 
“schizophrenic” preferences when deciding how to strike the 
most appropriate balance in the intellectual property system.112 
As I noted in the past: 
While [large developing countries such as China and India] 
may want stronger protection for their fast-growing 
industries and highly economically developed regions, they 
want weaker protection in the remaining areas. The 
economies of these countries, indeed, are highly complex, 
and the profound sub-regional disparities in socio-economic 
conditions and technological capabilities have made it very 
difficult to implement nation-based intellectual property 
standards.113 
In sum, the TPP does not include enough fast-growing, 
emerging middle-income economies to generate a large 
economic impact within the Asia-Pacific region. With a large 
                                                                                                             
109. Hong Kong, China–New Zealand Closer Economic Partnership Agreement, 
H.K.-N.Z., Mar. 29, 2010, available at http://www.tid.gov.hk/english/trade_relations/
hknzcep/text_agreement.html. 
110. Free Trade Agreement between Hong Kong, China and Chile, Chile-H.K., 
Sept. 7, 2012, available at http://www.tid.gov.hk/english/trade_relations/hkclfta/text_
agreement.html. 
111. See 2014 Index of Economic Freedom: Hong Kong, http://www.heritage.org/
index/country/hongkong (last visited Feb. 17, 2014) (stating that, “[t]hroughout the 
20-year history of the Index, Hong Kong has been rated the world’s freest economy”). 
112. See Yu, International Enclosure, supra note 19, at 21–33. 
113. Peter K. Yu, A Tale of Two Development Agendas, 35 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 465, 559 
(2009). 
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number of negotiating parties and chapters, the cross-sector 
disagreements among these parties also have made the TPP 
negotiations highly challenging. In fact, because the TPP has 
strong historical and continued ties to APEC, deadlocks in the 
negotiations could undermine the ability of APEC or other 
regional fora to provide an effective venue for further trade 
liberalization. 114  APEC is particularly important to the TPP 
because “[m]any of the big announcements about the 
[agreement] are made in conjunction with APEC meetings.”115 
The organization “is also an important incubator of ideas that 
could be taken into account in the TPP negotiations.”116 
III. EUROPE 
The third group of outsiders consists of European 
countries, including the twenty-eight members of the European 
Union and other countries in the region such as Switzerland. 
The exclusion of this group is logical, given the TPP’s regional 
focus and the group members’ geographical location. It would 
indeed be odd to admit the European Union or Switzerland into 
APEC. Nevertheless, the exclusion of Europe has greatly affected 
the dynamics of the TPP negotiations. Such exclusion also has 
serious ramifications for the future development of 
nonmultilateral agreements within the Asia-Pacific region. 
                                                                                                             
114. See Carlos Kuriyama, APEC and the TPP: Are They Mutually Reinforcing?, in 
TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP, supra note 10, at 242, 243 (“[T]he TPP itself is proving 
extremely useful for APEC as well, by demonstrating the utility of some of the ideas that 
have been discussed for years within the non-binding context of APEC. The TPP is 
actually providing one of the many avenues to strengthen regional economic 
integration in the APEC region.”); see also BEESON, INSTITUTIONS OF THE ASIA–PACIFIC, 
supra note 84, at 16 (“The key issue facing the Asia-Pacific region is whether it has 
enough political and ideological internal coherence to allow it to facilitate and 
encourage the underlying economic integration that has already occurred.”); id. at 53 
(“Many East Asians were already concerned that the ASEAN way of consensus and 
voluntarism was being overthrown by the pushy, insensitive and excessively legalistic 
Anglo-Americans as they tried to turn APEC into a forum for negotiation, rather than 
discussion.”); BEESON, REGIONALISM AND GLOBALIZATION, supra note 73, at 226 (“Some 
member countries were concerned about APEC’s inability to deliver trade 
liberalization, while others—especially Korea and Japan—were concerned that it might 
force them to open politically sensitive domestic sectors to external competition.”). 
115. Kuriyama, supra note 114, at 243. 
116. Id. 
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Consider, for example, the negotiation of intellectual 
property standards. The omission of European countries has 
affected not only the dynamics of the negotiation process, but 
also the types of issues that are to be negotiated. Without the 
European Union at the negotiation table, the United States is 
able to rely more on its sheer economic and geopolitical 
strengths to push for provisions that are in the interests of its 
intellectual property industries.117 From increased enforcement 
in the digital environment to greater protection of 
pharmaceutical products and biologics, the TPP is likely to track 
more closely to the high US standards than the compromised 
standards developed in other fora, including ACTA.118 
It is therefore no surprise that the TPP negotiations have 
resurrected those treaty terms that have already been rejected in 
other plurilateral negotiations involving the European Union, 
including the ACTA negotiations.119 These terms range from the 
safe harbors for online service providers to provisions on 
“cooperation” between copyright holders and these providers in 
the area of copyright enforcement.120 It is also not unusual to 
find the United States dominating the negotiation of the TPP 
intellectual property chapter. The technical expertise 
commanded by the large US intellectual property delegation has 
                                                                                                             
117. See Elms & Lim, supra note 53, at 37 (“Even Australia, regarded as the second 
most powerful state at the TPP table [at the time of the writing], was unable to prevail 
over the United States in bilateral negotiations.”). 
118 . See Peter K. Yu, The Alphabet Soup of Transborder Intellectual Property 
Enforcement, 60 DRAKE L. REV. DISCOURSE 16, 26 (2012) [hereinafter Yu, Alphabet Soup]. 
119. See Patricia Ranald, The Politics of the TPPA in Australia, in NO ORDINARY 
DEAL, supra note 10, at 40, 40 (“The negotiations for a Trans-Pacific Partnership 
agreement . . . resurrect many of the issues that were debated in the Australia-US Free 
Trade Agreement.”); Yu, Alphabet Soup, supra note 118, at 27 (“The TPP negotiators 
could also revive proposals that were rejected by the ACTA negotiators, especially the 
EU delegates.”); see also Capling & Ravenhill, supra note 15, at 291 (“Even for those 
countries that have existing bilateral PTAs with the US (Australia, Chile, Peru and 
Singapore), the TPP negotiations have provided the US with a new opportunity to push 
for changes in their trade partners’ domestic regulatory regimes that it was unable to 
secure in the earlier agreements.”). 
120. See Analysis of the Text of the Leaked TPP Intellectual Property Text Dated August 
2013, INFOJUSTICE.ORG, http://infojustice.org/tpp-leak-analysis (last visited Feb. 17, 
2014) (providing a collection of analyses of the leaked draft text of the TPP intellectual 
property chapter). See generally Sean M. Flynn et al., The U.S. Proposal for an Intellectual 
Property Chapter in the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, 28 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 105 
(2012) (discussing the US proposal for the TPP intellectual property chapter). 
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simply overwhelmed the delegates from other TPP negotiating 
parties. 
As if the United States’ economic and negotiation strengths 
were not enough, the country could offer concessions in other 
trade or trade-related areas in exchange for greater concessions 
in the intellectual property area. For instance, New Zealand may 
find it beneficial to make greater concessions in the intellectual 
property area if the United States is willing to allow for more 
exports in dairy, lamb, wool, and other sheep products.121 The 
same can be said about Vietnam and, to a lesser extent, Malaysia 
in regard to the United States’ concessions in textiles.122 By 
contrast, the European Union is unlikely to find similar 
                                                                                                             
121. As Deborah Elms observed: 
Dairy has been a headache for negotiators. Because the United States does 
not have a [preferential trade agreement] with New Zealand, this sector has 
never been addressed between the two countries before (unlike, say, the 
dispute between the United States and Australia over sugar). The primary 
issue for American milk producers is that New Zealand’s dairy industry is 
viewed as a monopoly, with one firm (Fonterra) in control of 90 percent of 
the market, and substantial barriers to entry into the market. If the American 
market were to be opened to competition through a [preferential trade 
agreement] like the TPP, dairy farmers feared that New Zealand dairy would 
enjoy unfair competitive advantages. 
Deborah K. Elms, Negotiations over Market access in Goods, in TRANS-PACIFIC 
PARTNERSHIP, supra note 10, at 109, 117; see also id. at 117 n.29 (providing an estimate 
of the National Milk Producers Federation that “US dairy producers would lose gross 
revenues of US$20 billion over the first ten years of a [preferential trade agreement]”); 
Lewis, TPP and RCEP, supra note 33, at 367–68 (“New Zealand’s main economic 
interest in the TPP is the potential for expanded access to the United States market for 
its dairy products. While New Zealand might ultimately be willing to trade off higher 
intellectual property standards in exchange for such market access, if dairy were to be 
excluded from the TPP, New Zealand would struggle to find enough value in the 
agreement to remain a participant.”). Nevertheless, Bryan Gould expressed skepticism 
about New Zealand’s perceived benefits provided by the TPP: 
We are . . . deluding ourselves if we believe that an enlarged free trade area 
will deliver wider markets and better returns for New Zealand exports, but 
will somehow spare us the obvious downsides. The likelihood is that New 
Zealand’s already depleted reserves of capital, talent and natural resources 
will be attracted to more promising prospects elsewhere in the wider free 
trade area, with the result that the country’s overall economic performance is 
more likely to decline in comparative terms than to improve. 
Bryan Gould, Political Implications for New Zealand, in NO ORDINARY DEAL, supra note 10, 
at 29, 34. 
122. See Elms, TPP Trade Negotiations, supra note 6, at 388 (“Vietnam, and to a 
lesser extent, Malaysia, have highly competitive textile industries.”). 
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concessions attractive enough to give up its proposals on 
intellectual property protection and enforcement. Thus, without 
the European Union’s involvement in the negotiations, the 
United States has a much easier time getting its intellectual 
property-related proposals accepted by other negotiating 
parties. 
It is worth recalling that, during the ACTA negotiations, the 
European Union and the United States had wide and deep 
disagreements over quite a number of issues. For example, the 
United States wanted to have stronger mandates concerning 
digital intellectual property enforcement, yet the European 
Union was not ready to agree to provisions that the Union had 
not yet harmonized. Examples of these yet-to-harmonize areas 
are the introduction of a graduated response system and safe 
harbors for online service providers.123 Similarly, although the 
European Union pushed hard for the inclusion of criminal 
liability for infringement on all forms of intellectual property 
rights (including most notably geographical indications), the 
United States was reluctant to provide such broad coverage.124 In 
the end, the two countries could only settle on a much more 
moderate agreement than what was originally advanced by both 
sides—an agreement that observers have since dubbed “ACTA 
Lite.”125 
Apart from impacting on the dynamics of the TPP 
negotiations, excluding Europe from the agreement could raise 
complicated questions concerning the future development of 
the international regulatory environment and the multilateral 
trading system. On June 17, 2013, the European Union and the 
United States launched the negotiation of the Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (“TTIP”) Agreement.126 The 
                                                                                                             
123. See Yu, Six Secret Fears, supra note 56, at 1055–57. 
124. See Monika Ermert, European Commission on ACTA: TRIPS Is Floor Not Ceiling, 
INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Apr. 22, 2009, 7:18 PM), http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/
2009/04/22/european-commission-on-acta-trips-is-floor-not-ceiling/. 
125. Monika Ermert, Treaty Negotiators Turn to “ACTA Lite” in Hopes of Closure, 
INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Sept. 8, 2010, 4:39 AM), http://www.ip-watch.org/2010/09/
08/treaty-negotiators-turn-to-%E2%80%9Cacta-lite%E2%80%9D-in-hopes-of-closure/. 
126. Press Release, Office of the USTR, U.S., EU Announce Decision to Launch 
Negotiations on a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (Feb. 13, 2013), 
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first round of negotiations was held in Washington, D.C. in July 
2013. As the USTR declared on its website: 
T-TIP will be an ambitious, comprehensive, and high-
standard trade and investment agreement that offers 
significant benefits in terms of promoting U.S. international 
competitiveness, jobs, and growth. This ambitious trade and 
investment agreement will aim to boost economic growth in 
the United States and the EU and add to the more than 13 
million American and EU jobs already supported by 
transatlantic trade and investment.127 
It remains to be seen what impact the TTIP will have on the 
TPP negotiations. Would the provisions found in both the TPP 
and TTIP create the much-needed nexus between the European 
Union and the TPP negotiating parties?128 Would the TTIP serve 
as the missing link between free trade agreements established by 
the United States (including the TPP) and the free trade and 
economic partnership agreements established by the European 
Union? Would the TTIP raise the standards embraced by the 
                                                                                                             
available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2013/february/
statement-US-EU-Presidents. 
127 . Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP), U.S. TRADE 
REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/ttip (last visited Sept. 13, 2013). 
128. As Meredith Lewis observed: 
To the extent that would-be participants (and dual participants) are 
wondering whether their commitments made in the TPP or the RCEP would 
be more likely to become multilateralized, (de jure through the WTO process 
or de facto through additional FTA proliferation), the TTIP would suggest the 
answer to that question is the TPP. Presumably the United States would, in 
TTIP negotiations, seek to import in as many commonalities as possible with 
the TPP in order to create common rules across even more countries. If the 
EU and the TPP countries all take a common approach to an issue—for 
example, state-owned enterprises—then that has a better chance of becoming 
the global approach than anything developed within the RCEP. At the same 
time, the understanding that the U.S. will be seeking to include TPP-
consistent provisions into the TTIP may well make countries participating in 
both the RCEP and TPP more intent on fighting for the terms they want in 
the TPP. This could result in more protracted TPP negotiations, but it also 
creates an incentive to conclude the agreement soon. If the EU were to push 
the U.S. in the TTIP towards a position the TPP participants didn’t like, that 
situation would be more dangerous the farther from completion the TPP was 
at the time. Once terms are locked in via the TPP, however, it would seem 
unlikely the U.S. would pursue a contradictory approach in the TTIP. 
Lewis, TPP and RCEP, supra note 33, at 370–71. 
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TPP negotiating parties, due in part to the already high EU and 
US standards and in part to the limited need for these two 
trading powers to foster compromises in the form of exceptions, 
limitations, safeguards, and flexibilities? Would the TTIP involve 
an entirely different set of issues and concerns and therefore 
create inconsistencies or even conflicts that further complicate 
the existing international regulatory environment and 
multilateral trading system? These are all questions that do not 
have clear and immediate answers. 
Within the Asia-Pacific region, the exclusion of Europe 
from the TPP could also raise complications concerning the 
future development of nonmultilateral trade and investment 
agreements, especially those established by the European 
Union. Regardless of whether the TTIP will become successful, 
it is important to explore what the TPP negotiations will mean 
for the European Union. If the TPP were established, would the 
United States become more effective in trading with the TPP 
members to the detriment of Europe? If so, would the European 
Union and other European countries respond by negotiating 
their own bilateral, plurilateral, and regional agreements with 
countries in the Asia-Pacific region, similar to the economic 
partnership agreements that the European Union has already 
established with South Korea and is now negotiating with India, 
Malaysia, Singapore, and other members of ASEAN?129 
One could also ask some specific questions about the global 
transplant of international trade and regulatory standards. For 
example, if the TPP were established, would the TPP 
negotiations make US models more dominant in the Asia-Pacific 
region than European and other models, due in part to the 
successful transplant of US standards onto the TPP Agreement 
and eventually on to the soil of other TPP members?130 If so, 
                                                                                                             
129 . See Free Trade Agreements, EUROPEAN COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/
enterprise/policies/international/facilitating-trade/free-trade/ (last visited Feb. 17, 
2014) (providing a list of EU free trade agreements concluded and in negotiation). 
130. For discussions of legal transplants in the intellectual property area, see Peter 
K. Yu, Can the Canadian UGC Exception Be Transplanted Abroad?, 26 INTELL. PROP. J. 
(forthcoming 2014); Peter K. Yu, Digital Copyright Reform and Legal Transplants in Hong 
Kong, 48 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 693 (2010). See generally ALAN WATSON, LEGAL 
TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW (2d ed. 1993) (articulating the 
legal transplant thesis). 
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would such transplants precipitate greater rivalry between the 
European Union and the United States over what standards they 
seek to export to other countries via bilateral, plurilateral, and 
regional trade and investment agreements? Would such rivalry 
lead to inconsistencies, tensions, or conflicts over trade and 
regulatory standards?131 Would this rivalry precipitate what I 
have called the “battle of the FTAs”?132 
In sum, even though the geographical location of 
European countries has made it logical for them to be excluded 
from the TPP, such exclusion could have serious ramifications 
for the negotiations and the agreement’s benefits, significance, 
and viability. Such exclusion could also affect the negotiation of 
other nonmultilateral trade and investment agreements in the 
Asia-Pacific region as well as the future development of the 
international regulatory environment and the multilateral 
trading system. 
                                                                                                             
131. As Robert Scollay wrote: 
A particular problem for convergence arises if more than one major economy 
establishes its own FTA “template”, and if there are inconsistencies between 
the different “templates”. The outlook then is for the establishment of 
multiple “hub and spoke” configurations centred on each major economy as 
a “hub”, where the FTAs in each configuration converge on the “template” 
of the “hub”, but where the prospect of convergence between the 
configurations with their inconsistent “templates” is remote. Other 
economies may then either seek to follow one of the “hub” templates in their 
own FTAs, as Mexico has tended to do (essentially following the NAFTA 
template), or, if they seek to participate in more than one “hub and spoke” 
configuration, be willing to adapt the design of their FTAs to the “template” 
of each configuration, as Chile and Singapore have tended to do. 
Robert Scollay, Prospects for Linking Preferential Trade Agreements in the Asia-Pacific Region, 
in AN APEC TRADE AGENDA?, supra note 32, at 164, 185; see also Peter K. Yu, Currents 
and Crosscurrents in the International Intellectual Property Regime, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 323, 
398–99 (2004) [hereinafter Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents] (discussing the potential 
conflicts between different bilateral and regional trade agreements); Yu, Access to 
Medicines, supra note 77, at 386 (suggesting that “conflicts may arise if less developed 
countries sign the trade agreements supplied by both the European Communities and 
the United States without appropriate review and modification”). 
132. See Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements, supra note 31, at 1018–27 (discussing the 
“battle of the FTAs”). 
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IV. CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS 
While the first three groups of TPP outsiders consist of state 
actors, the last group comprises non-state actors. Similar to the 
ACTA negotiations, the TPP negotiations have been widely 
criticized for their lack of transparency, accountability, and 
democratic participation. Notably omitted is the representation 
of civil society organizations, which Sisule Musungu and Graham 
Dutfield have considered “the single most important factor in 
raising the issue of the impact of the international intellectual 
property standards . . . on development issues such as health, 
food and agriculture.”133 Although the USTR insisted that the 
TPP is negotiated in a similar manner as the negotiation of 
other bilateral, plurilateral, and regional trade agreements—at 
least according to the USTR134—its secretive negotiations stand 
in sharp contrast to other more transparent international 
negotiations, including the region-based Free Trade Area of the 
Americas and those concerning the WTO and UN specialized 
agencies, such as WIPO.135 
In the past, the public is generally not interested in trade or 
intellectual property treaty negotiations, which are dull, legalese, 
complex, and highly technical. 136  Nevertheless, as the 
                                                                                                             
133. Sisule F. Musungu & Graham Dutfield, Multilateral Agreements and a TRIPS-
plus World: The World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) 22 (Quaker United 
Nations Office, TRIPS Issues Paper No. 3, 2003), available at http://
www.geneva.quno.info/pdf/WIPO(A4)final0304.pdf (footnote omitted). 
134. See Yu, Six Secret Fears, supra note 56, at 1005 (“Although both the European 
Union and the United States have taken more open approaches in negotiations at 
WIPO, WTO, WHO, and other international fora, negotiations at the bilateral and 
plurilateral levels have indeed been kept secret in the past.” (footnote omitted)). 
135 . For discussions of the openness in WIPO, WTO, the World Health 
Organization, and other international fora, see Letter from Robert Weissman, Dir., 
Essential Action, to Susan Schwab, U.S. Trade Rep. 1–3 (Sept. 17, 2008), available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/archive/assets/Document_Library/Fact_Sheets/2008/asset_uplo
ad_file98915121.pdf; Memorandum from Elec. Frontier Found. et al. to Ron Kirk, U.S. 
Trade Rep., attachment 1 (July 22, 2009), available at http://www.keionline.org/misc-
docs/4/attachment1_transparency_ustr.pdf. 
136. See ANDREW GOWERS, GOWERS REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 1 (2006) 
(“For many citizens, Intellectual Property . . . is an obscure and distant domain—its 
laws shrouded in jargon and technical mystery, its applications relevant only to a 
specialist audience.”); SELL, supra note 28, at 99 (“To a certain extent IP law is 
reminiscent of the Catholic Church when the Bible was in Latin. IP lawyers are 
privileged purveyors of expertise as was the Latin-trained clergy.”); Yu, Currents and 
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negotiations became more intrusive on one’s personal life and 
as the negotiated agreements began to include provisions 
concerning the internet and the digital environment, civil 
society organizations and the public at large have begun paying 
greater attention to the standards included in these agreements. 
For example, the negotiation of ACTA led to the 
widespread online coverage of the leaked drafts and updates on 
the negotiations.137 The effort to adopt the agreement in the 
European Union also led to massive street protests throughout 
Europe in the middle of the winter—in major cities such as 
Amsterdam, Berlin, Copenhagen, Krakow, Munich, Paris, 
Prague, Sofia, Stockholm, and Vienna.138 In addition, “a petition 
of 2 million signatures was handed in to the European 
Parliament, and thousands of emails were sent to Members of 
the European Parliament.”139 These protests and signatures not 
only “ignited coverage of ACTA in the mainstream media, which 
had largely ignored the issue up to that point,”140 but eventually 
led to the European Parliament’s resounding rejection of the 
trade agreement in June 2012.141 This rejection marked the first 
                                                                                                             
Crosscurrents, supra note 131, at 419 (“In the past, intellectual property issues were 
considered arcane, obscure, complex, and highly technical.”). 
137. As I observed in an earlier article: 
While disclosure of official information remained sparse at this stage of 
negotiations, civil liberties groups had been active in providing information 
to help the public understand the agreement’s potential impact. For 
example, in March 2008, more than a couple of months before the first 
round of negotiations, IP Justice published a pioneering and very informative 
white paper discussing the potential negotiation items on ACTA. Academics 
and civil liberties groups across the world also worked hard to obtain 
information through FOIA, the Canadian Access to Information Act, or their 
equivalents. Many of them even managed to obtain “leaked” information or 
documents, which were quickly posted onto the Internet via WikiLeaks and 
other websites. In addition, commentators—most notably Professor Geist—
offered concise yet valuable commentary on the potential provisions while 
keeping the public up-to-date about the state of the negotiations. 
Yu, Six Secret Fears, supra note 56, at 1016–17 (footnotes omitted). 
138 . See MONICA HORTEN, A COPYRIGHT MASQUERADE: HOW CORPORATE 
LOBBYING THREATENS ONLINE FREEDOMS 107–14 (2013). 
139. Id. at 115. 
140. Id. at 108. 
141. “The final outcome was rejection of ACTA by an astonishing 478 votes to 39, 
with 165 abstentions.” Id. at 127; see also id. at 106 (“In 2012 that all changed, and 
ACTA exploded onto the public stage with massive street protests in sub-zero 
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time the Committee on International Trade of the European 
Parliament struck down a trade agreement.142 
In the United States, the entertainment industry’s push for 
controversial domestic copyright legislation, such as the 
PROTECT IP Act (PIPA)143 and the Stop Online Piracy Act 
(SOPA), 144  also led to an unprecedented, massive service 
blackout launched by Wikipedia, Reddit, WordPress, and other 
internet companies. 145  This blackout, in turn, caused 
Congressional representatives to quickly withdraw their support 
for the controversial bills, leading SOPA and PIPA to die in the 
112th Congress. 146  As Senator Ron Wyden succinctly 
summarized in his reminder to then-USTR Ronald Kirk in a 
Senate Finance Committee hearing, “[t]he norm changed on 
Jan. 18, 2012, when millions and millions of Americans said we 
will not accept being locked out of debates about Internet 
freedom.”147 
To some extent, the recent massive public protests can be 
traced back to the anti-globalization protests at the turn of this 
millennium in Seattle, Washington, Prague, Quebec, and 
Genoa.148 What is different today, however, is the protestors’ 
                                                                                                             
temperatures, forcing government U-turns and prompting accusations that the EU had 
engaged in corrupt policymaking.”). 
142. See Monika Ermert, Unprecedented Vote: EU Parliament Trade Committee Rejects 
ACTA, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (June 21, 2012, 2:38 PM), http://www.ip-watch.org/
2012/06/21/unprecedented-vote-eu-parliament-trade-committee-rejects-acta/. 
143 . Preventing Real Online Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of 
Intellectual Property Act of 2011 (PIPA), S. 968, 112th Cong. (2011). See generally 
Letter from John R. Allison, Professor, Univ. of Tex. at Austin, et al. to Members of the 
U.S. Cong. (July 5, 2011), available at http://cdt.org/files/pdfs/SOPA_House_
letter_with_PROTECT_IP_letter_FINAL.pdf (arguing against the adoption of the 
PROTECT-IP Act). In the interest of full disclosure, the Author signed onto this letter. 
144. Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA), H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (2011). 
145. See Jonathan Weisman, In Fight Over Piracy Bills, New Economy Rises Against 
Old, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2012, at A1. 
146. See Yu, Alphabet Soup, supra note 118, at 32–33. 
147. Joseph J. Schatz, Technology Groups Worry About Trade Pact, CQ TODAY ONLINE 
NEWS (Mar. 13, 2012, 11:47 PM), http://public.cq.com/docs/news/news-
000004045563.html?ref=corg. 
148. See Peter K. Yu, World Trade, Intellectual Property, and the Global Elites: An 
Introduction, 10 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 3 (2002) (noting the protests); see also 
Yu, A Tale of Two Development Agendas, supra note 113, at 566 (“[T]he anti-globalization 
protests in Seattle, Washington, Prague, Quebec, Genoa, and other major cities have 
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changing and more specific focus. Instead of broad, and at times 
vague, issues such as globalization or the WTO, the current 
protests target concrete issues, such as what individuals can or 
cannot do on the internet. As civil society organizations, civil 
liberties groups, consumer advocates, and user communities 
become more familiar with the issues in the public intellectual 
property debate, and as they gain more knowledge about the 
secretive bilateral, plurilateral, and regional negotiations, their 
criticisms will become even more powerful. Even if these 
individuals and organizations do not always get the specific 
complex legal issues entirely correct—as Justin Hughes 
lamented149—their voice and grievances deserve considerable 
attention. 
Indeed, it is amazing how much activism one can now find 
in the intellectual property field.150 As Amy Kapczynski observed: 
Who would have thought, a decade or two ago, that college 
students would speak of the need to change copyright law 
with “something like the reverence that earlier generations 
displayed in talking about social or racial equality”? Or that 
advocates of “farmers’ rights” could mobilize hundreds of 
thousands of people to protest seed patents and an 
[intellectual property] treaty? Or that AIDS activists would 
                                                                                                             
helped provide the needed background and momentum to the push for reforms in the 
international intellectual property system.”). 
149. Professor Hughes observed: 
What is good about the SOPA/PIPA debate is that significantly more citizens 
got involved and the legislative process responded to that activism by 
postponing votes on the bills. But the good part came at quite a cost. The 
public discourse on SOPA/PIPA quickly became as uninformed, vitriolic, and 
warped as our public debates about national healthcare. Corporate behavior 
on both sides contributed to the mess—that’s no surprise. But so did legal 
academics. Academics conflated issues in the bill with an enthusiasm you’d 
expect from Rush Limbaugh or Rachel Maddow. Law professors who in an 
earlier time would have told you that the Internet interprets control as 
damage and routes around it were ready—in the interest of rhetorical 
flourish—to oppose the bills with a “don’t break the Internet” mantra. 
Justin Hughes, Introduction, 30 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 7 (2012). 
150 . See SEBASTIAN HAUNSS, CONFLICTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY: THE 
CONTENTIOUS POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 2 (2013) (highlighting the social 
conflicts precipitated by “[t]he struggles against ‘biopiracy’, i.e. the private 
appropriation of traditional (indigenous) knowledge, the conflicts about file-sharing in 
peer-to-peer networks, the coming-together of the access to knowledge (A2K) 
movement and the advent of Pirate Parties in various European countries”). 
1174 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37:1129 
engage in civil disobedience to challenge patents on 
medicines? Or that programmers would descend upon the 
European Parliament to protest software patents?151 
What happened today in the intellectual property field is 
very different from the time when the internet just started to 
enter the mainstream. One may still remember James Boyle’s 
pioneering call for the creation of “a politics of intellectual 
property” in the mid-1990s when the internet first entered the 
mainstream.152 As he declared at that time: 
A successful political movement needs a set of 
(popularizable) analytical tools which reveal common 
interests around which political coalitions can be built. Just 
as “the environment” literally disappeared as a concept in 
the analytical structure of private property claims, simplistic 
“cause and effect” science, and markets characterized by 
negative externalities, so too the “public domain” is 
disappearing, both conceptually and literally, in an 
intellectual property system built around the interests of the 
current stakeholders and the notion of the original author. 
In one very real sense, the environmental movement 
invented the environment so that farmers, consumers, 
hunters and birdwatchers could all discover themselves as 
environmentalists. Perhaps we need to invent the public 
domain in order to call into being the coalition that might 
protect it.153 
Although intellectual property activism still has a long way to go 
before it reaches the same level as environmental activism, such 
activism has certainly gone a long way since Professor Boyle 
made this important call for action. 
Finally, one should not ignore how the lack of 
transparency, accountability, and democratic participation in 
the TPP negotiations could backfire on the longstanding efforts 
on the part of the United States and other TPP negotiating 
                                                                                                             
151. Amy Kapczynski, The Access to Knowledge Mobilization and the New Politics of 
Intellectual Property, 117 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 262, 263 (2008), http://
digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4296&context=fss_papers 
(footnotes omitted). 
152. James Boyle, A Politics of Intellectual Property: Environmentalism for the Net?, 47 
DUKE L.J. 87 (1997). 
153. Id. at 113. 
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parties to promote transparency and rule of law in the Asia-
Pacific region.154 It is indeed disturbing that leaders of these 
parties fail to practice what they preach when the message 
becomes an inconvenient barrier to achieving economic goals. 
Such failure, to some extent, reminds us of the harsh criticisms 
these same countries made when Asian leaders prioritized 
economic development over the protection for civil and political 
rights.155 
In fact, if the TPP includes transparency provisions, similar 
to other bilateral, plurilateral, regional, or multilateral 
agreements,156 those provisions would become some of the most 
ironic and hypocritical provisions ever written into a treaty 
adopted for the Asia-Pacific region.157 After all, it is very difficult 
to find a good justification for a nontransparent, unaccountable, 
and undemocratic process to develop a treaty that calls for 
transparency. It also makes one wonder whether the way the 
TPP is negotiated would create a perverse excuse for 
authoritarian governments in the Asia-Pacific region to conduct 
affairs in a nontransparent, unaccountable, and undemocratic 
manner. 
To be certain, these governments might still conduct affairs 
in this manner if the TPP were negotiated in a transparent, 
accountable, and democratic manner. The “no worse off” 
argument was indeed quite frequently offered in response to 
this line of criticism. Nevertheless, one should not ignore the 
considerable political costs incurred in conducting affairs in a 
nontransparent manner. These costs are significant even in 
countries that do not offer much political freedom. When the 
practices of foreign countries are offered as justifications, much 
of the government’s political capital will be saved. Without 
comparison, the local people in those countries will also lose an 
                                                                                                             
154. Cf. Yu, Six Secret Fears, supra note 56, at 1050–59 (discussing how the ACTA 
negotiations could backfire on these longstanding efforts). 
155. For discussions of the Asian values debate in the human rights area, see 
generally sources cited in Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property and Asian Values, 16 MARQ. 
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 329, 337 n.26 (2012). 
156. E.g., ACTA, supra note 21, art. 30; TRIPS Agreement, supra note 24, art. 63. 
157. See Yu, Six Secret Fears, supra note 56, at 1015. 
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opportunity to see how negotiations could have been done 
differently. 
CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE 
The TPP negotiations have raised a lot of important 
questions concerning the future development of trade relations 
in the Asia-Pacific region, the international regulatory 
environment, and the multilateral trading system. It has also 
sparked a debate on how bilateral, plurilateral, and regional 
agreements should be negotiated in the future,158 especially 
when these agreements include provisions concerning the 
internet and the digital environment. Although it remains 
unclear how the TPP negotiations will evolve, or whether China, 
India, or other large developing countries in the region would 
eventually join the agreement, it is clear that the negotiations 
will have harmful consequences if they are conducted in the 
same manner as it is today. 
For example, the negotiations could lead to the creation of 
a tri-polar world, in which three dominant trading systems will 
be created under the leadership of China, Europe, and the 
United States.159 If these systems materialize, they could bring 
forth inconsistent, or even conflicting, rules and standards that 
undermine the international regulatory environment and 
multilateral trading system. The TPP negotiations could also 
greatly accelerate the development of the RCEP and other 
nonmultilateral agreements within the Asia-Pacific region. 
                                                                                                             
158 . See Principles for Intellectual Property Provisions in Bilateral and Regional 
Agreements, MAX-PLANCK-INSTITUT FÜR INNOVATION UND WETTBEWERB, http://
www.ip.mpg.de/files/pdf2/Principles_for_IP_provisions_in_Bilateral_and_
Regional_Agreements_final1.pdf (last visited Jan. 6, 2014) (outlining principles to 
facilitate the development of “international rules and procedures that can achieve a 
better, mutually advantageous and balanced [international intellectual property] 
regulation”); see also Peter K. Yu, The Strategic and Discursive Contributions of the Max 
Planck Principles for Intellectual Property Provisions in Bilateral and Regional Agreements, 62 
DRAKE L. REV. DISCOURSE 20 (2014) (discussing these principles). 
159. See Lewis, Achieving a FTAAP, supra note 34, at 226 (“The US . . . has been 
facing the prospect of a world with three major economic trading blocs: the Americas, 
the EU and an Asian bloc.”). Bryan Mercurio made a similar observation at “The Trans 
Pacific Partnership Agreement: Impact and Implications” Workshop at the Faculty of 
Law, Chinese University of Hong Kong. 
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Although more than half of the TPP negotiating parties 
(Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, 
Singapore, and Vietnam) are also negotiating the RCEP, 
countries are unlikely to have the ability, resources, and 
sustained interest in actively developing two rather similar trade 
pacts in the same region. At some point, countries will have to 
decide whether they want to focus on one or the other.160 It is 
therefore no surprise that “[a]n analyst with the Asian 
Development Bank has predicted that ASEAN+6 and the TPP 
will ultimately merge together.” 161  Likewise, Merdith Kolsky 
Lewis observed: 
[Such merger] is a definite possibility. It is hard to envision 
economies such as India or China agreeing in the near-term 
to the comprehensive liberation on trade in goods that 
acceding to the TPP would entail. At the same time, it also 
does not seem realistic that in the long-term there will be an 
FTAAP that does not include China. Furthermore, should 
Korea and Japan agree to join the TPP, it would not be in 
China’s interest to remain on the outside. . . . [Thus, i]t is 
possible that these competing considerations will coalesce 
via an ultimate melding together of the TPP with ASEAN+6, 
such that non-TPP members of ASEAN+6 phase in their 
commitments over a longer and later time period.162 
                                                                                                             
160. See id. at 231 (“The most likely alternatives to the TPP . . . are either 
ASEAN+6 or ASEAN+3, or perhaps a new model with a China-Japan-Korea FTA at its 
core.”); Lewis, TPP and RCEP, supra note 33, at 369–70 (“Of course there is nothing to 
stop countries from seeking to join both the TPP and the RCEP, and several countries 
in ASEAN seem inclined to do so by seeking to join the TPP. But particularly for 
countries with limited human and financial resources for negotiations and those 
outside the Asia-Pacific, it will probably be the case that countries will seek to join one 
or the other rather than both.”); see also id. at 223 (examining the prospects for the 
TPP to expand into a FTAAP); Kelsey, supra note 82, at 17–18 (“[T]he TPPA was 
envisaged as the foundation for an APEC-wide free trade agreement.”). 
161. Lewis, Achieving a FTAAP, supra note 34, at 235. 
162. Id. Deborah Elms expressed skepticism over such a merger: 
Of course, a lot will ultimately depend on what happens with RCEP and the 
level of ambition shown. From the beginning however, a merger is already 
looking tricky. For instance, RCEP explicitly allows special and differential 
treatment for developing economies, while the TPP does not. The TPP 
mandates are much broader and deeper than the agenda drawn up by the 16 
RCEP parties. It is highly likely that, at the end of the day, the TPP members 
will be reluctant to drop down the level of ambition in the TPP to meet the 
RCEP or that RCEP members will come up much farther to meet the TPP. 
 
1178 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37:1129 
Finally, just as the United States is willing to negotiate the 
TTIP with the European Union, it may be willing to negotiate 
separate agreements with other major trading powers in the 
Asia-Pacific region, such as China and Japan. The discussion of a 
bilateral trade agreement with Japan began in response to the 
latter’s emergence as an economic power in the 1980s.163 Even 
though such discussion has now subsided, Japan continues to 
play an important role in the region. It is therefore no surprise 
that some commentators have wondered whether China’s 
growing importance in the Asia-Pacific region would lead to 
more intense rivalry between China and Japan.164 If such rivalry 
                                                                                                             
 [E]ven if a merger of some sort were possible between RCEP and the TPP, 
creating a 21 member [preferential trade agreement] in such a fashion would 
likely be a poor way to draft an agreement. Docking on and massaging 
existing commitments to fit a new environment is less likely to deliver 
maximum benefits to all parties than a new agreement negotiated from the 
beginning. 
Elms, TPP Trade Negotiations, supra note 6, at 396–97. 
163. See, e.g., Michael Aho, More Bilateral Agreements Would Be a Blunder: What the 
President Should Do, 22 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 25, 33–35 (1989) (questioning the 
advantages of a US-Japan bilateral trade agreement); Max Baucus, A New Trade Strategy: 
The Case for Bilateral Agreements, 22 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 1, 8–17 (1989) (contending that 
Japan would be a particularly attractive target for a new bilateral trade agreement). 
164. William Callahan disagreed: 
Both Japan and China are “reluctant powers” that are not willing to take the 
lead in regional integration (indeed, the main activities of each seem to 
involve forestalling the other from assuming regional leadership). This 
reluctance stems from a regional environment that is characterized by fears of 
Japan’s past (militarism) and of China’s future (hegemonism). The Japanese 
empire regionalized East Asia during the first half of the twentieth century, 
and Chinese and Korean memories of this period still stress the violence of 
Japanese occupation and colonialism. Because of this suspicion of its 
intentions, Japan repeatedly failed to shape an East Asian regionalism in the 
1960s and 1970s. 
 China has been unable to take the lead in forming regional institutions 
because its East Asian neighbours worry about the character of Chinese 
hegemony. Its recent rapid economic growth and military modernization 
present a potential threat to regional order and stability. Moreover, there are 
concerns that China’s future leadership will follow the pattern of its imperial 
past. Some fear that the PRC is modernizing the traditional Sinocentric 
order, where the Middle Kingdom is surrounded by a periphery of tributary 
states and barbarians, as a model for its new hegemonic politics. 
William A. Callahan, Comparative Regionalism: The Logic of Governance in Europe and Asia, 
in THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF EU-CHINA RELATIONS 231, 242–43 (David Kerr & 
Liu Fei eds., 2007) (footnote omitted); see also Zhang Yunling & Tang Shiping, China’s 
Regional Strategy, in POWER SHIFT, supra note 74, at 48, 55 (“China understands that the 
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occurs, Japan may be eager to foster a stronger alliance with the 
United States, India, and other major countries in the Asia-
Pacific region.165 Countries in the region may also welcome the 
United States to play a larger role166—a role that will certainly 
benefit Japan. 
Recent years have also seen growing discussions of the need 
for a bilateral investment agreement between China and the 
United States. 167  Such an agreement is especially attractive 
among those advocating greater engagement between China 
and the United States in the form of a G-2 partnership.168 After 
                                                                                                             
future of the region depends upon a constructive relationship between China and 
Japan.”). Simon Tay concurred: 
Asian regionalism is moving forward—but without clear direction and 
leadership. Without change in Japan, there can be no rapprochement with 
China. This deprives East Asian regionalism of what should logically be its 
main driver, a partnership between China and Japan, akin to that in Europe 
between France and Germany. The idea of a shared leadership with China 
seems alien to the Japanese, and vice versa. Asia’s contentious history 
combines with fundamental differences to raise tensions and lead to flash 
points between Japan and China that the region has no proven capacity to 
handle. 
TAY, supra note 12, at 82. 
165. As Professor Tay explained: 
As China continues to grow and charm fellow Asians, Japan cannot compete 
on its own. It recognizes this and has clung to its alliance with the United 
States and, in 2007, reached out to Australia, the closest American ally in Asia. 
Similarly, Japan has been reaching out economically to engage India as a 
counterweight to China. Even if Japan cannot compete with China in the 
near future, or even presently, it can be spoiler in Asian regionalism. Japan 
might limit Asia’s effective progress by lack of cooperation or by taking steps 
to bandwagon against China, forcing rivalry and tension as other Asians find 
they have to choose sides. 
TAY, supra note 12, at 81–82. 
166. See Lewis, Achieving a FTAAP, supra note 34, at 232 (“[G]iven concerns about 
China’s economic and military might, some Asian Countries may welcome the US 
playing a greater role in the region, and the opportunity to forge linkages with the 
US.”). 
167 . For discussions of such an agreement, see generally David A. Gantz, 
Challenges for the United States in Negotiating a BIT with China: Reconciling Reciprocal 
Investment Protection with Policy Concerns, 31 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. (forthcoming 
2014); Kong Qingjiang, U.S.-China Bilateral Investment Treaty Negotiations: Context, Focus, 
and Implications, 7 ASIAN J. WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y 181 (2012). 
168. As Fred Bergsten argued: 
The United States should . . . implement a subtle but sharp change in its basic 
economic strategy toward China. Instead of focusing on bilateral problems 
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all, in recent years, China and the United States have already 
actively cooperated in addressing a large variety of global 
problems, which range from climate change to global economic 
recovery. As Fred Bergsten and his colleagues reminded us: 
It is now clear that an effective response to every major 
international economic issue requires close cooperation 
between [China and the United States]. There will be no 
sustained recovery from the global economic crisis unless 
China and the United States lead it and they have 
appropriately launched by far the largest stimulus programs 
in the world. There will be no renewed momentum toward 
trade liberalization through the Doha Round or otherwise, a 
credible defense against the protectionist pressures that 
have been intensified by the crisis, unless they endorse it. 
There will be no international cooperation on global 
warming unless they embrace it. The United States is the 
world’s largest deficit and debtor country, and China is the 
world’s largest surplus and creditor country, and without 
                                                                                                             
and complaints, and seeking to coopt China into a global economic system 
that it would try to continue leading by itself, the United States should seek to 
develop a true partnership with China to provide joint leadership of that 
system, even if the system requires substantial modifications to persuade 
China to play that role. The two economic superpowers should begin to 
pursue together the development of coordinated, or at least cooperative, 
approaches to global issues that can be resolved effectively only through their 
active co-management. Such a “G-2” approach would accurately recognize, 
and be perceived by the Chinese as accurately recognizing, the new role of 
China as a legitimate architect and steward of the international economic 
order. 
BERGSTEN ET AL., supra note 47, at 22–23; see also STEFAN A. HALPER, THE BEIJING 
CONSENSUS: HOW CHINA’S AUTHORITARIAN MODEL WILL DOMINATE THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY 25 (2010) (“[T]he American and Chinese economies are heavily 
interdependent. America has grown addicted to Chinese credit; China has grown 
equally addicted to American consumption. The depth of this interdependence creates 
a relationship that is stabilized in a kind of economic version of mutually assured 
destruction.”); Walden Bello, Chain-Gang Economics: China, the US, and the Global 
Economy, in CHINA’S NEW ROLE, supra note 65, at 7, 11 (describing “a chain-gang 
relationship” between China and the United States in light of their growing economic 
interdependence); Niall Ferguson & Moritz Schularick, “Chimerica” and the Global Asset 
Market Boom, 10 INT’L FIN. 215 (2007) (coining the term “Chimerica”). But see HALPER, 
supra, at 216–18 (arguing against elevating the US–China relationship to a special G-2 
bilateral partnership). See Generally ZACHARY KARABELL, SUPERFUSION: HOW CHINA AND 
AMERICA BECAME ONE ECONOMY AND WHY THE WORLD’S PROSPERITY DEPENDS ON IT 
(2009) (discussing the intertwined economic relationship between China and the 
United States). 
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their concurrence there will be neither resolution of the 
global imbalances that helped bring on the current crisis 
nor lasting reform of the international financial 
architecture.169 
In sum, as far as the future goes—whether it relates to the 
development of trade relations in the Asia-Pacific region, the 
international regulatory environment, or the multilateral 
trading system—the TPP negotiations have created more 
perplexities than certainty and predictability. Without the 
inclusion of China, India, and other fast-growing, emerging 
middle-income countries, the agreement is likely to have a 
limited impact in the Asia-Pacific region. At this point, it is also 
unclear whether the benefits the negotiations provide would 
outweigh their exorbitant geopolitical, economic, social, 
cultural, and technological costs. 
The TPP negotiations greatly deserve continued and more 
dedicated attention from policymakers, commentators, and the 
public at large, including those from countries not hitherto 
involved in the TPP negotiations as well as those located outside 
the Asia-Pacific region. As much as we want to know what will be 
included in the final text of the TPP Agreement, we also need to 
be conscious of what has been excluded from the negotiations 
and what such exclusion means for the Asia-Pacific region, the 
international regulatory environment, and the multilateral 
trading system. 
  
                                                                                                             
169. BERGSTEN ET AL., supra note 47, at x–xi. 
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